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C O M M E N T S
The Water Marketing Solution
by Mark Squillace
Mark Squillace is a Professor of Law and the Director of the Natural Resources 
Law Center at the University of Colorado Law School .
Water markets have special appeal in the western United States where the prior appropriation doctrine favors historic, low-value agricultural 
water rights over other valuable water rights .1 Yet, despite 
the allure of water markets for moving water, especially 
from agricultural to urban use, the legal, political, and 
practical obstacles to the operation of such markets have 
proven far more elusive than market theory would predict .2 
Although water transfers occur on a fairly regular basis in 
most western states,3 they do not occur as quickly or as eas-
ily as they would likely occur in a free market, even where 
1 . The consumptive municipal use of water in Denver, Colorado, amounts to 
234,000 acre-feet per year, which is equivalent to 2% of all of Colorado’s 
statewide consumptive use . About Us, DenverWater’sWaterUse, Denver 
Water, availableat http://www .denverwater .org/AboutUs/KeyFacts/ . Met-
ropolitan Denver has a gross municipal product of $152 .8 billion, which is 
approximately 66% of the Colorado State gross domestic product (GDP) of 
$231 .6 billion . U .S . Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Anal-
ysis, 2011, availableat http://www .bea .gov/newsreleases/regional/gdp_met-
ro/2011/pdf/gdp_metro0211 .pdf . U .S . Department of Commerce, Bureau 
of Economic Analysis, 2011, availableat http://www .bea .gov/newsreleases/
regional/gdp_state/2011/pdf/gsp0611 .pdf . Irrigation in the state of Colo-
rado accounted for 90% of the consumptive use within the state in 2005 . 
Estimated Use of Water in the United States, U .S . Geological Sur-
vey, U .S . Department of the Interior (2005), availableat http://pubs .usgs .
gov/circ/1344/pdf/c1344 .pdf . Net farm income in Colorado accounted for 
$745 million or approximately 0 .3% of the state GDP in 2009 . StateFact
Sheets:Colorado, U .S . Department of Agriculture (July 11, 2011), available
at http://www .ers .usda .gov/StateFacts/CO .HTM .
2 . See A . Dan Tarlock, Law of Water Rights and Resources §2:13 (1988) .
3 . See Bonnie G . Colby et al ., ProceduralAspectsofStateWaterLaw:Transfer-
ringWaterRightsintheWesternStates,WaterTransferSymposium, 31 Ariz . 
L . Rev . 697, 697 (1989) (summarizing the procedural differences in the 
evaluation of water right change applications across eight western states) .
water supplies are stressed, and the transaction costs asso-
ciated with many proposed transfers often prove prohibi-
tive .4 Indeed, the costs, delays, and uncertainties posed by 
water transfers have combined to discourage many munici-
pal water suppliers from viewing such transfers as a viable 
option for solving their water supply problems .5 In short, 
the story of water transfers in the western United States is 
largely a story of market failure .6
One consequence of the failure of water markets is that 
many cities continue to turn to engineering solutions to 
address water supply needs, despite the enormous environ-
mental, political, and economic costs of such proposals,7 
4 . See,e.g., Peter D . Nichols & Douglas S . Kenney, WateringGrowthinColora-
do:SweptAlongbytheCurrentorChoosingaBetterLine, 6 U . Denv . Water 
L . Rev . 411, 422 (2002-2003) .
The minimal transaction costs of acquiring existing trans-basin 
diversions for municipal use are a sharp contrast to the extreme 
costs associated with newly proposed trans-basin diversions . For 
example, the American Water Development, Inc . (AWDI) pro-
posal to export water from the San Luis Valley to the Denver 
Metro area consumed nine years and several million dollars in 
attorneys’ fees and engineering fees associated with expert testi-
mony presented in court . The Colorado Supreme Court ended 
AWDI’s plans when it upheld the District Court’s dismissal of 
AWDI’s water rights application .
 American Water Dev ., Inc . v . City of Alamosa, 874 P .2d 352, 357, 359, 368 
(Colo . 1994) .); seealso Charles W . Howe et al ., TransactionCostsasDetermi-
nantsofWaterTransfers, 61 U . Colo . L . Rev . 393 (1990) .
5 . See,e.g., Sarah Klahn, TheBlindManandtheElephant:DescribingDrought
in Colorado, 6 U . Denv . Water L . Rev . 519, 534 (2003) (“As in past 
droughts, the legislature has determined that one solution is to build more 
storage projects .  .  .  . The legislature adopted Senate Bill 236, which request-
ed voter approval to float $2 billion in bonds for reservoir construction as a 
part of a so-called ‘drought-package .’”) .
6 . See,e.g., Loyal M . Hartman & Don Seastone, Water Transfers: Eco-
nomic Efficiency and Alternative Institutions 1 (1970); seealso James 
F . Booker et al ., EconomicsandtheModelingofWaterResourcesandPolicies, 
25(1) Nat . Res . Model . 168, 173 (2012) (“[C]ompetitive markets for wa-
ter are rare if not absent throughout the world .”) . See Bonnie G . Colby et al ., 
ProceduralAspectsofStateWaterLaw:TransferringWaterRightsintheWestern
States,WaterTransferSymposium, 31 Ariz . L . Rev . 697, 697 (1989) (sum-
marizing the procedural differences in the evaluation of water right change 
applications across eight western states); seealso Charles W . Howe et al ., 
TheEconomicImpactsofAgriculture-to-UrbanWaterTransfersontheAreaof
Origin:ACaseStudyoftheArkansasRiverValleyinColorado, 72 Am . J . Ag-
ric . Econ . 1200, 1202 (1990) (“A major U .S . Geological Survey-funded 
study (MacDonnell, et al .) has found frequent water transfers in several 
western states (Colorado, New Mexico, Utah) but infrequent transfers in 
other states (e .g ., California and Wyoming), the frequency being strongly 
affected by the institutional structure for effecting transfers and the pres-
sure on water supplies .”) .
7 . See Euclid v . Ambler Realty, 272 U .S . 365, 397 (1926); Golblatt v . Town of 
Hempstead, 369 U .S . 590, 592 (1962); Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass’n 
Author’sNote:ThisArticleisanabridgedversionofanarticlethat
willappearinVolume53,No.1,oftheNatural Resources Journal . 




often described as the “Super Ditch,” which would facilitate
temporarytransfersofagriculturalwater intheArkansasValleyof
Coloradotourbanuse.Asimpliedbythetitle,thelong-formarticle
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and the relative advantages of water transfers .8 If the politi-
cal, legal, and practical problems associated with traditional 
transfers could be fixed, the demand for new engineering 
projects would likely disappear .9 One important aspect of 
any legal reform then must be to address in a meaningful 
way the very real problems that transfers have historically 
created while at the same time finding ways to simplify and 
streamline the transfer process .
Overcoming the obstacles to water transfers is not just 
about promoting economic efficiency . It is also about 
protecting the environment and minimizing impacts on 
the communities in remote water basins that have often 
become the target for the seemingly insatiable demands of 
growing urban centers . The good news is that water trans-
fers can be optimized and made more attractive with rela-
tively modest reforms to current law .
This Article suggests concrete solutions to promote 
the development of robust water markets . It begins with 
a review of water transfers in the western United States 
and historical water use patterns that help illuminate the 
problem . It then considers opportunities for moving agri-
cultural water to urban use by studying successful water 
transfer systems . To those who know water allocation law, 
it will come as no surprise that many of these systems have 
evolved in the context of special purpose water districts10 
and mutual ditch companies .11 Since special purpose dis-
tricts and mutual ditch companies provide well over one-
half the water to water users in the West,12 focusing reform 
v . DeBenedictis, 480 U .S . 470, 488, 17 ELR 20440 (1987); Palazzolo v . 
Rhode Island, 533 U .S . 606, 631, 32 ELR 20516 (2001) .
8 . See, e.g., Douglas S . Kenney, Relative Costs of NewWater Supply Options
forFrontRangeCities, Phase 1 Report 21 (July 2010) (unpublished draft), 
availableat http://www .rlch .org/archive/wp-content/uploads/2010/07/10_
RR_Kenneycostofwater1 .pdf . (“[O]ur estimates of representative costs (in 
$/AF) are as follows: new projects, $16,200; water transfers, $14,000; and 
conservation, $5,200 .”) .
9 . Seeinfra notes 52-53 and accompanying text .
10 . It is difficult to simplify descriptions of these districts, other than to say that 
they are quasi-governmental agencies organized in accordance with detailed 
legislation adopted in the various states . John Leshy once aptly noted the
practical impossibility of generalizing about modern special water 
districts . They are, in fact, rather like snowflakes, each with its own 
unique form . Many of these typically lengthy statutes apply to only 
one or a handful of districts, and only a few lawyers and district 
managers may be familiar with their provisions .
 John D . Leshy, SpecialWaterDistricts—TheHistoricalBackground, in Spe-
cial Water Districts: Challenge for the Future (James Corbridge ed ., 
1983) .
11 . See John H . Davidson, MutualDitchorWaterCorporations, in Waters and 
Water Rights, §26 .02 (Robert E . Beck ed ., 1991) (explaining that mutual 
ditch companies are “usually in the form of a non-profit corporation orga-
nized for the exclusive benefit of the users in a particular area who became 
its stockholders,” with the goal of “provid[ing] a vehicle for organizing the 
distribution of water so that the individual water users were relieved of the 
burden of managing the ditch”) .
12 . See,e.g., Barton H . Thompson Jr ., InstitutionalPerspectivesonWaterPolicy
andMarkets, 81 Cal . L . Rev . 671, 688 (1993) . In 1978, public water dis-
tricts supplied 56 .8% of California’s water, mutuals supplied 9 .0%; public 
water districts supplied 7 .1% of Colorado’s water, mutuals supplied 69 .9%; 
public water districts supplied 24 .7% of Wyoming’s water, mutuals supplied 
30 .7% . Id. tbl . 2 .
efforts on such agencies could be an efficient way to mod-
ernize water transfer law . The Article then derives lessons 
from these examples and concludes with a series of recom-
mendations for reforming western water law in ways that 
will promote more sensible water management .
I. Background
From its earliest incarnations, the prior appropriation 
doctrine that evolved in most western states allowed per-
fected13 water rights to be transferred from their original 
use to some other beneficial use .14 The interdependent 
nature of most prior appropriation water rights has per-
suaded states to authorize such transfers only where they 
can be carried out without injury to existing users .15 Such 
injuries may occur, for example, where they reduce the 
amount or timing of return flows .16 Moreover, to avoid 
burdening existing users with the need to prove injury, 
many states place the burden of showing “no injury” on 
the proponent of the transfer .17
13 . As a general rule, states do not allow parties to transfer unperfected rights, 
that is, rights that have not been applied to the beneficial use for which 
they were authorized, in part because of the fear that allowing such trans-
fers would promote speculation . See,e.g., Catherland Reclamation Dist . v . 
Lower Platte North Natural Resources Dist ., 433 N .W .2d 161, 165 (Neb . 
1988); Green River Development Co . v . FMC Corp ., 660 P .2d 339, 344 
(Wyo . 1983) .
14 . At least one western state, Wyoming, initially prohibited transfers entirely . 
See Wyo . Stat . §41-3-101 (2011), which to this day provides in relevant 
part that “[w]ater rights for the direct use of the natural unstored flow of 
any stream cannot be detached from the lands, place or purpose for which 
they are acquired .  .  .  .” This prohibition has since been superseded by an 
express provision that allows transfers, but only under strict conditions . 
Wyo . Stat . §41-3-104 (2011) . Other western states have taken a more 
liberal view of transfers, but generally subject to the no injury standard . 
For example, Ariz . Rev . Stat . Ann . §45-172 (2011) allows water transfers 
with some limitations . “A water right may be severed from the land to 
which it is appurtenant or from the site of its use if for other than irrigation 
purposes and with the consent and approval of the owner of such right may 
be transferred .  .  .  .” Id.
15 . Ariz . Rev . Stat . Ann . §45-172(A)(2) (2011) states in relevant part that, 
“[v]ested or existing rights to the use of water shall not be affected, infringed 
upon nor interfered with, and in no event shall the water diverted or used 
after the transfer of such rights exceed the vested rights existing at the time 
of such severance and transfer .   .   .   .” Cal . Water Code §1745 .07 (2011) 
states in relevant part that “[n]o transfer of water pursuant to this Article or 
any other provision of law shall cause a forfeiture, diminution, or impair-
ment of any water rights .”
16 . See,e.g., Phoenix Water Co . v . Fletcher, 23 Cal . 481, 487 (Cal . 1863); Law-
rence J . MacDonnell & Teresa A . Rice, MovingAgriculturalWatertoCities:
TheSearchforSmarterApproaches, 2 Hastings W .-Nw . J . Envtl . L . & Pol’y 
27, 28 (1994-1995):
The understanding reached in Colorado is that a proposed transfer 
should be considered in terms of its net depletive effects on the 
stream and on the manner in which it would change the timing of 
flows . A reduction in the historical availability of water to another 
appropriator, either because of increased depletion by the new use 
or because the new use changes the timing with which the water 
is available to other appropriators, will be regarded as an injury to 
those appropriators and will not be permitted .
17 . See,e.g., Santa Fe Trail Ranches Property Owners Ass’n v . Simpson, 990 P .2d 
46, 58 (Colo .1999), which held in part:
[i]n a change of use and augmentation case, applicant seeking 
change must demonstrate that the timing of diversions and the 
Copyright © 2012 Environmental Law Institute®, Washington, DC. Reprinted with permission from ELR®, http://www.eli.org, 1-800-433-5120.
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On its face, the no injury rule is simple and sensible . It 
helps ensure that priorities among water users on a given 
stream are not upset by changes to the system instigated 
by an existing user or her successor .18 Unfortunately, as 
currently implemented, the no injury rule often imposes 
extraordinary transaction costs, primarily in the form of 
legal and expert fees . In particular, uncertainties about 
the scope and extent of injuries from a proposed transfer 
encourage parties on both sides to hire experts to predict 
an outcome that favors the legal position of their clients .19 
In addition to the significant costs associated with prov-
ing or disproving injury, all of this also takes considerable 
time, which means that a transfer applicant may not know 
for several years whether her application will be approved 
and, if so, how much water will be authorized for transfer 
if it is approved .20
Arguably, much of the cost and uncertainty associ-
ated with water transfers is attributable to the resistance 
of the agricultural community to any transfers that pro-
pose moving water out of agricultural use .21 This resistance 
quantity of consumption for the changed use will not exceed those 
of the perfected appropriation, and that return flows of native wa-
ters from the decreed use at its place of use—upon which junior 
appropriators and prospective new appropriators often depend for 
their supply-will not be diminished .
 Seealso Farmer’s High Line Canal & Reservoir Co . v . City of Golden, 975 
P .2d 189, 197 (Colo . 1999), which held in relevant part that “[i]t is the 
water court’s duty to hear testimony regarding the alleged injurious effects 
of the change of use of water and to aid the parties in crafting conditions of 
water rights decree to prevent such injury .” Put differently, “[c]hanging the 
place of diversion of adjudicated water rights cannot enlarge or expand the 
water right at the expense of other appropriators or the state .” W .S . Ranch 
Co . v . Kaiser Steel Corp ., 439 P .2d 714,718 (N .M . 1968) .
18 . MacDonnell & Rice, supra note 16, at 30-31 . (“At one level, such protec-
tion [the no injury rule] makes eminent good sense; transfers ought not to 
leave other water users in the same system worse off .”) .
19 . Injuries may result not only from the loss of water resources from a par-
ticular basin, but also the loss of late season flows that often result from the 
application of water to upstream agricultural lands . See Hall v . Kuiper, 510 
P .2d 329 (Colo . 1973); seealso John H . Davidson, Reallocation,Transfer,and
ChangeElements, in Waters And Water Rights §14 .04(c) (Robert E . Beck 
ed ., 1991) .
20 . See,e.g., supra note 4, at 420 (“Complex cases can stretch over years and 
attract dozens of opponents . For example, litigation over Union Park ex-
tended from 1984 through 2000, and included over twenty parties .” Bd . 
of County Comm’rs of County of Arapahoe v . Crystal Creek Homeowners 
Ass’n, 14 P .3d 325, 329 (Colo . 2000)); id. at 421:
Although engineers can estimate the yield of a water right, adjudi-
cation is necessary to determine consumptive use . Thus, purchas-
ers of existing rights for new municipal uses may not know in 
advance the actual yield of the rights they are purchasing for trans-
fer . The junior protection rule [Colo . Rev . Stat . Ann . §37-902-
305(3) (2002)] guarantees in many, perhaps most, situations that 
not all of a water right can be transferred, and it is not apparent at 
the time of filing a change case which junior appropriators will be 
injured and what will be necessary to keep them whole, even with 
extensive engineering .
 See also Bonny Colby Saliba et al ., DoWater Market Prices Appropriately
MeasureWaterValues, 27 Nat . Resources J . 617, 621 (1987) (explaining 
that when individuals are unable to ascertain the legal rights and restrictions 
of a water purchase, they are unlikely to purchase a water right) .
21 . See,e.g., In re Application of Howard Sleeper, 760 P .2d 787, 788-89 (N .M . 
Ct . App . 1988) (responding to protestants challenge that a transfer of water 
rights to a ski resort harmed the public welfare); MacDonnell & Rice, supra 
note 16 (“Purchases of agricultural lands in the Owens Valley and the associ-
ated water rights by the City of Los Angeles earlier in this century, provoked 
so much controversy that it essentially ended water marketing as a way of 
meeting urban water demands in California until the last ten years .”) .
stems, in part, from the threats that water transfers pose 
to the economic stability of rural communities .22 Perhaps 
most obviously, moving water from farms to cities usu-
ally means a loss of the economic activity associated with 
the farmland itself .23 When cities buy irrigated farmland 
for the purpose of transferring the water resources, they 
have often engaged in what some have pejoratively called 
“buy and dry”24 practices . Buy and dry refers to the situ-
ation where the buyer essentially abandons the land after 
the water rights are transferred without adequate consider-
ation of the need to restore the land to a stable and produc-
tive state .25 So, instead of reverting to native grasses that 
might contribute to a bucolic setting, attractive to tourists 
and new settlers, the land subject to buy and dry practices 
may become infested with unattractive, opportunistic, 
non-native weeds, that further diminish the prospects for 
a vibrant rural economy . Reforms are likely to be viewed 
skeptically by rural communities if they perceive a stream-
lined water transfer process as a vehicle for undermining 
rural economies .
Irrigated agriculture is far and away the dominant con-
sumptive use of water resources in the West .26 Thus, it 
seems inevitable that cities looking for new water supplies 
will cast their gaze toward agricultural communities . Agri-
cultural water rights are also attractive because they tend to 
be the most senior rights .27 While agriculture is an impor-
22 . Steven J . Shupe et al ., WesternWaterRights:TheEraofReallocation, 29 Nat . 
Resources J . 413, 428-30 (1989) (“Water right transfers threaten not only 
county tax bases, but also the overall economic health of rural areas  .   .   . 
The overall quality and character of life can be undermined in areas where 
historic irrigation suddenly is terminated .”) .
23 . Studies from California, Colorado, and Oregon confirm “that water avail-
ability is a significant determinate of farmland value .” Economic Impacts 
of Climate Change on Agricultural Water Use in California, 15 
(2005), availableat http://www .energy .ca .gov/2005publications/CEC-500-
2005-054/CEC-500-2005-054 .PDF and http://are .berkeley .edu/~fisher/
ClimateChange .pdf; Brian E . Gray, TheShapeofTransferstoCome:AModel
WaterTransferActforCalifornia, 4 Hastings W .-Nw . J . Envtl . L . & Pol’y 
23, 40 (1996) (discussing loss of economic activity associated with transfer 
of water); Charles W . Howe & Christopher Goemans, EconomicEfficiency
andEquityConsiderationsinRegionalWaterTransfers:AComparativeAnalysis
ofTwoBasinsinColorado 13 (2003) .
24 . See,e.g., 26th Annual Water Law Conference: Twenty-FirstCenturyWater
Supply,UseandDistribution:DotheRulesStillApply?, 11 U . Denv . Water 
L . Rev . 389, 405-06 (2008):
“[B]uy and dry” [is] the permanent transfer [of water] from agricul-
tural use to municipal use that can dry the land .  .  .  . [T]he transfer 
is a one-time deal where municipalities buy shares in a ditch com-
pany, often far from the municipality, and the water is permanently 
removed from irrigation use by the ditch company . The irrigator 
and the region then can suffer from the limited or lost agricultural 
productivity resulting from the water transfer .
25 . Seeid .
26 . For example, an estimated 90% of the total water consumed in Colorado 
was used for irrigation in 2005 . Estimated Use of Water in the United 
States, supra note 1 . In Montana, 96% of the total water consumed was 
used for irrigation . Id. In California, irrigation accounted for 74% of total 
state water use . Id.
27 . See,e.g., Charles T . DuMars, PublicPolicyConsiderationsinStateWaterAl-
locationsandManagement, 42 Rocky Mtn . Min . L . Inst . 24, 24-4 (1996) 
(“While the demand for urban uses is increasing, most senior water rights 
remain in agricultural uses criticized by some as economically inefficient .”); 
Adam Schempp, WesternWater in the21stCentury:Policies andPrograms
ThatStretchSuppliesinaPriorAppropriationWorld, 40 ELR 10394, 10411 
(Apr . 2010) (“Water rights can remain with lower value uses, such as ag-
riculture (commonly the most senior water rights) .”); see also Dudley D . 
Copyright © 2012 Environmental Law Institute®, Washington, DC. Reprinted with permission from ELR®, http://www.eli.org, 1-800-433-5120.
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tant component of the economies of these rural areas, it is 
not a significant part of the overall economy in any western 
state .28 Therefore, while the politics of reforming transfer 
laws will undoubtedly prove daunting, even with proposals 
that are sensitive to rural impacts, the legal obstacles posed 
by changing existing water transfer laws are relatively easy 
to surmount .
II. Water Transfers and the Takings Clause
One of the great myths of western water law is that water 
rights are property rights that are essentially inviolable . 
Under this view, the no injury rule for water transfers is 
effectively compelled by the U .S . Constitution . To be sure, 
water rights are vested property rights, and unless those 
rights are abandoned or wasted, they cannot generally be 
reclaimed by the state without paying just compensation .29 
But this is not to say that the use of these rights cannot be 
managed or restricted in ways that go beyond the restric-
tions imposed in the original grant . Such post-acquisition 
restrictions are common to most forms of property and do 
not inevitably lead to a valid claim that the property rights 
have been unconstitutionally “taken .”30
Moreover, for several reasons, water rights are among 
the most tenuous forms of property, and as such they have 
one of the least compelling claims to be free from govern-
ment restrictions, even where such restrictions are imposed 
after the rights are perfected . First, in every American state 
with positive water law, water resources are owned by the 
state . A water right gives only a right to use the water, and 
while even use rights can be quite valuable, states have his-
torically given them to water users for free .31 While this 
largesse does not license the state to withdraw these rights 
once they are granted, states have always claimed the power 
to set rules to regulate, among other things, the allocation 
of water, abandonment and forfeiture of rights, transfers of 
water rights, and beneficial use of water resources . And as 
with forms of real property, states may sometimes add new 
rules or set new restrictions on existing water rights with-
out compensating the owner . Those new rules are not likely 
to lead to a valid “takings” claim unless they interfere with 
the owner’s “distinct investment-backed expectations .”32
Johnson, AnOptimal State ofWaterLaw:FixedWaterRights andFlexible
MarketPrices, 57 Va . L . Rev . 345 (1971) .
28 . See Terry L . Anderson, Water Crisis: Ending the Policy Drought 
(1983); see also Harrison C . Dunning, State Equitable Apportionment of
WesternWaterResources, 66 Neb . L . Rev . 76, 78 (1987) .
29 . Compare Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage District v . United States, 49 Fed . 
Cl . 313 (2001) with Klamath Irrigation District v . United States, 67 Fed . 
Cl . 504 (2005) . Seealso Brian E . Gray, ThePropertyRightinWater, 9 Hast-
ings W-NW J . Envtl . L . & Pol’y 1 (2002) .
30 . See U .S . Const . amend . V (“ .  .  . norshallprivatepropertybetakenforapub-
licusewithoutjustcompensation”); seealso Village of Euclid, Ohio v . Amber 
Realty Co ., 272 U .S . 365 (1926) (upholding post-acquisition restrictions 
and corresponding diminution of value against a takings challenge) . Penn 
Central Transportation Co . v . City of New York, 438 U .S . 104, 8 ELR 
20528 (1978) .
31 . One notable exception is the state of Montana, which provides for leasing 
large water rights from the state . Mont . Code Ann . §85-2-407 .
32 . SeePennCentral, supra note 30 .
To be sure, claims that a state or federal rule gives rise to 
an unconstitutional taking of a private party’s water rights 
do sometimes arise, and are occasionally successful .33 One 
strategy, for example, is to argue that a restriction that cur-
tails the amount of water available to a user amounts to a 
partial “physical taking” of the water . The U .S . Supreme 
Court has suggested that a physical taking constitutes a 
per se taking of property .34 But unless the state is physically 
appropriating the water for its own use, the restriction is 
more likely to be viewed as a regulatory restriction sub-
ject to the more forgiving test articulated by the Supreme 
Court in Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York
City .35 There, the Court held that a regulation that restricts 
the use of property should be examined to determine “[t]
he economic impact of the regulation on the claimant and, 
particularly, the extent to which the regulation has inter-
fered with distinct investment-backed expectations .  .  .  .”36 
Restrictions that do not interfere with the reasonable, 
investment-backed expectations of the owner are unlikely 
to be found to cause a taking . Given the widespread toler-
ance for minor injuries to water rights that occur under 
the current prior appropriation system, it seems unlikely 
that minor injuries to existing users that might result from 
modest changes in the current water transfers system would 
interfere with the distinct, investment-backed expectations 
of the existing user .
III. The Economics of Water Transfers
Understanding why water markets have historically failed 
to provide for the efficient reallocation of water requires a 
basic understanding of microeconomic theory . A compet-
itive market typically exhibits the following characteris-
tics: (1) a large numbers of buyers and sellers; (2) products 
that are fungible, or indistinguishable to consumers; 
(3)  consumers and producers with perfect information 
about prices and quality; and (4) firms with equal knowl-
edge of and access to relevant technology .37 Markets lack-
ing one or more of these characteristics may fail to allocate 
goods efficiently .
At first blush, water rights might seem to fit these char-
acteristics reasonably well . Many people own water rights, 
and many others are interested in buying those rights . 
33 . See Hage v . United States, 51 Fed . Cl . 570 (2002) .
34 . See Loretto v . Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp ., 458 U .S . 419, 426, 
435-36 (1982) (holding that a permanent physical occupation of private 
property, however minor, results in a per se taking, regardless of the public 
interest advanced by the occupation .); seealso Klamath Irrigation District v . 
United States, 635 F .3d 505, 41 ELR 20094 (Fed . Cir . 2011); Sacramento 
Grazing Ass’n, Inc . v . United States, 96 Fed . Cl . 175 (2010) . As with any 
property, the physical taking of a water right requires physical occupation, 
such as a diversion, in order to implicate the PennCentral test .
35 . 438 U .S . 104, 124, 8 ELR 20528 (1978) .
36 . Id. (citing Pennsylvania Coal Co . v . Mahon, 260 U .S . 393 (1922)) . The 
Court also considered the “the character of the governmental action,” re-
ferring specifically to the notion that a physical invasion is more likely to 
support a takings claim .
37 . David Besanko & Ronald R . Braeutigam, Microeconomics 330 
(2011) . The authors suggest that water markets seem to fail primarily be-
cause water rights are not fungible and to a lesser extent because information 
about price and value is likely imperfect .
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Basic information about the sale price of water is reason-
ably well-known,38 and interested parties have some sense 
about the value of water in individual water basins .39 But a 
closer look reveals some structural problems that will have 
to be overcome if the free market in water is ever going to 
thrive . In particular, under the current legal system, water 
rights often fail the fungibility test because they are not 
homogenous . Moreover, information about the price and 
quality of water may be skewed by the limited number of 
transfers and the dominant influence of the Colorado-Big 
Thompson (CBT) market in the transfer picture .40
In order to be fungible, a water right must essentially 
be the same anywhere it is available within a given geo-
graphic market . Put another way, if water rights were fun-
gible, a buyer interested in purchasing an acre-foot of water 
should be able to walk into a marketplace and purchase 
that acre-foot of water at a negotiated price, and then take 
that water to the desired point of end use . The location and 
quality of that acre-foot of water may affect the price, since 
it will have to be delivered to the point of use, and perhaps 
treated to bring it to the quality required for that use . But 
the value of property is commonly dependent on location 
and quality, and such differences by themselves should not 
deter water transactions . The real obstacle to the fungibil-
ity of water rights seems to be the uncertainty that the no 
injury rule brings to the transfer .41 Uncertainty causes sig-
nificant delays and denies the buyer the ability to know 
exactly how much water will be available for use after the 
transfer .42 Thus, the buyer cannot accurately compare the 
cost of water available for transfer with water that might be 
available from a water development project or some other 
source .43 Moreover, this uncertainty greatly increases the 
transaction costs associated with transferring water, and 
overcoming this uncertainty is too often an expensive, 
complex, and time-consuming task .44
38 . David S . Brookshire et al ., Water Resources Research 1 (2004) .
39 . Decisions to pursue engineering solutions, for example, are generally 
weighed against the relative cost of acquiring water through transfers . See,
e.g., NorthernIntegratedSupplyProjectDEIS, supra note 5 .
40 . Seeinfra notes 62-64 and accompanying text . The CBT project is discussed 
in greater detail at Part V .I .A . of the Article . Seealso Besanko & Braeu-
tigam, supra note 37, at 330; Bonnie Colby Saliba & David B . Bush, 
Water Markets 23 (1987) .
41 . Bonny Colby Saliba et al ., DoWaterMarketPricesAppropriatelyMeasure
WaterValues?, 27 Nat . Resources J . 617, 621 (1987) (explaining that when 
individuals are unable to ascertain the legal rights and restrictions of a water 
purchase, they are unlikely to purchase a water right) .
42 . Id. at 645 (1987) (noting that legal, hydrologic, and economic uncertainties 
are present in water markets and reduce market participation and distort 
market prices); seealsoTransactionCostsasDeterminants, supra note 4, at 
3 (noting that because water transfers must go through the review of the 
Water Court or State Engineer, and because the Water Court may impose 
conditions upon the transfer, Colo . Rev . Stat . Ann . §37-92-305(4)(a), the 
final transfer is likely to contain terms not found in the original application 
such as: restrictions on total volume, flow rate, and timing) .
43 . See Saliba et al ., supra note 41, at 651 (explaining that information regard-
ing the amount and price of water as well as the restrictions that will be 
placed on the use of said water are essential in the valuation process of a 
proposed transfer of water) .
44 . Uncertainties in water transfers lead to buyers and sellers bearing the cost 
of risks that take the form of brokerage service fees, hydrology studies, and 
legal representation . TransactionCostsasDeterminants, supra note 4, at 3 . 
These transaction costs become prohibitively large for most prospective par-
ties to a transfer as is evidenced by the proposed American Water Develop-
As previously described, the no injury rule allows any 
existing water user who might be affected by a proposed 
transfer to block that transfer even for minor injuries that 
might result from the proposed changes to the water sys-
tem . Such injuries might include, for example, a change in 
the timing of return flows .45 Consequently, a water right 
taken from one location on a stream is not fungible with 
a water right taken from another location on that same 
stream if existing users are in a position to complain about 
injuries, such as the loss of late-season return flows .
Importantly, this problem does not manifest itself with 
storage water rights, which is why successful water markets 
are so often associated with stored water .46 Stored water in 
the western United States is typically collected in the spring 
as snow melts in the mountains, and the owner’s priorities 
are satisfied at the time of storage . Most of the large storage 
projects are owned and managed by special-purpose water 
districts and mutual ditch companies, which is one reason 
that these agencies have proved more capable of transfer-
ring water efficiently .47
As already noted, one of the chief obstacles to mak-
ing water rights fungible is the inadequate definition of 
water as a property right . Western water law has tradition-
ally defined water rights in terms of the amount of water 
that can be diverted out of a stream .48 While this may be 
a necessary requirement for identifying a property right 
in water, it is hardly sufficient if the goal is to promote 
a robust water market . This is because the system largely 
functions on the basis of the amount of water consumed, 
not the amount of water diverted .49 More specifically, the 
diversion amount tells a prospective buyer very little about 
the amount of water that might be available for transfer . 
If water rights were defined both in terms of a diversion 
amount and a consumptive use amount, the prospects for a 
free market in water would brighten markedly .50 In partic-
ular, one can easily imagine a thriving market of consump-
ment, Inc . transfer that spent nine years in court and several million dollars 
in attorneys and engineering fees . See American Water Dev ., Inc . v . City of 
Alamosa, 874 P .2d 352, 357, 359 (Colo . 1994); seealso Nichols & Kenney, 
supra note 4, at 422; seealso Charles W . Howe et al ., supra note 6, at 1200 
(1990) (“Water sales and subsequent transfers may be negotiated over sev-
eral years  .  .  . There is no such thing as a clean-cut water transfer .”) .
45 . See,e.g., Colo . Rev . Stat . Ann . §37-92-304(a)(II) (2011) .
46 . See,e.g., Margaret Bushman LaBianca, TheArizonaWaterBankandtheLaw
of the River, 40 Ariz . L . Rev . 659, 676 (1998); Morris Israel & Jay R . 
Lund, RecentCaliforniaWaterTransfers:ImplicationsforWaterManagement, 
35 Nat . Resources J . 1, 13 (1995); seealso Booker et al ., supra note 6, at 
206 (“Economists have long suggested that market institutions such as wa-
ter rights transfers and water banks have the potential to increase economic 
efficiency relative to traditional water allocation institutions .  .  .  .”) .
47 . For a discussion of a robust water market and its accompanying storage 
facilities, see notes 18-21 and accompanying text .
48 . Nichols & Kenney, supra note 4, at 421 .
49 . Santa Fe Trail Ranches Property Owners Ass’n v . Simpson, 990 P .2d 46, 52, 
59 (Colo . 1999) .
50 . See Lawrence J . MacDonnell, PublicWater-PrivateWater:Anti-Speculation,
WaterReallocationandHighPlainsA&M, LLC v . Southeastern Colorado 
Water Cons District, 10 U . Denv . Water L . Rev . 1, 3 (2006) (suggesting 
that consumptive use “effectively privatizes the water”); Antony Frank & 
David Carlson, Colorado’s Net Irrigation Requirements for Agriculture, tbl . 
1 Colorado Dept . of Agriculture (1995), availableat http://cospl .coalliance .
org/fez/eserv/co:3072/ag92ir71999internet .pdf; Nichols & Kenney, supra 
note 4, at 421 .
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tive use amounts within a single water basin, and perhaps 
even among multiple basins .
Of course, even defining water rights in terms of con-
sumptive use would not by itself make transfers any easier . 
Current law in most jurisdictions explicitly recognizes the 
right of existing water users to block transfers if they suf-
fer injuries, even where the transfer amount is limited to 
consumptive use .51 However, a relatively simple change to 
the law would require water rights to be defined in terms 
of their consumptive use and to presumptively allow that 
amount—perhaps subject to a small discount—to be trans-
ferred . Indeed, such a change would be easy to accommo-
date under the current legal regime, would likely cause no 
greater injury than is already tolerated under other aspects 
of the law, and could potentially limit other forms of injury .
For example, in every western state, agricultural water 
users are free to grow any crop they can successfully culti-
vate . But the choice of crop greatly affects the amount of 
water consumed . In Colorado, alfalfa typically consumes 
nearly two acre-feet of water per acre, whereas sunflowers 
consume 1 .34 acre-feet of water per acre .52 Yet, an agri-
cultural user may freely switch from sunflower to alfalfa, 
even if such a change causes a significant injury to existing 
users . Likewise, in most western states, agricultural users 
are free to recapture and reuse water, so long as they recap-
ture and reuse the water for the same purpose and on the 
land for which the rights were appropriated, even if such 
reuse increases the amount of water consumed .53 Finally, 
measuring the amount of water diverted through a ditch 
is far from an exact science, and measurement errors are 
routinely tolerated, even if they might cause injury to exist-
ing users .54 Defining water rights in terms of consumptive 
use would ensure that efforts to recapture and reuse, or 
to change crops, would not result in the consumption of 
water resources in excess of the legal allotment .
Furthermore, minor departures from the priority sys-
tem are common in the prior appropriation system, and 
are tolerated even where they might harm vested water 
rights . So, for example, the fact that an inaccurate flume 
might injure another water user by effectively allowing the 
diversion of more than one’s entitlement55 or the fact that 
51 . See,e.g., Colo . Rev . Stat . Ann . §37-92-304 (2011); Wyo . Stat . §41-3-
104(a) (2011) .
52 . Rachel Barta et al ., Colorado High Plains Irrigation Practices Guide Water 
Saving Options for Irrigators in Eastern Colorado, tbl . 1 (2004), availableat 
http://www .cwi .colostate .edu/publications/sr/14 .pdf . Seealso Save the Pou-
dre Coalition, AReviewoftheLikelyAgriculturalImpactsFromtheNorthern
IntegratedSupplyProject, app . A (Sept . 7, 2008), availableat http://www .
savethepoudre .org/docs/stp_ag_impacts_analysis .pdf, citing the U .S . De-
partment of Agriculture 2002 Census of Agriculture, available at http://
www .agcensus .usda .gov/ and U .S . Department of Agriculture, National Ag-
ricultural Statistics Service, availableat http://www .nass .usda .gov/ . Seealso 
Antony Frank & David Carlson, Colorado’s Net Irrigation Requirements 
for Agriculture, tbl . 1 Colorado Dept . of Agriculture (1995) .
53 . See, e.g., Montana v . Wyoming, 131 S . Ct . 1765, 1779, 41 ELR 20168 
(2011); Cleaver v . Judd, 393 P .2d 193, 195-96 (Or . 1964); Bower v . Big 
Horn Canal Assoc ., 307 P .2d 593, 601 (Wyo . 1957) .
54 . See Mark Squillace, AccountingforWaterRightsintheWesternUnitedStates, 
in International Water Accounting: Effective Management of a 
Scarce Resource (2012) .
55 . Id.
an appropriator might change crops and thereby consume 
more water in a manner detrimental to an existing user, 
will not generally trigger a valid legal claim by an injured 
water user . Likewise, an existing user may recapture, reuse, 
and thereby consume more water than was historically 
consumed, to the detriment of other users, without giving 
rise to a valid cause of action .56 Tolerating such vagaries in 
the priority system is probably sensible and perhaps even 
necessary to the efficient operation of the system, but it 
also illustrates how a water right is not the inviolable form 
of property that some wish to claim for it .
These examples highlight the inconsistent way that 
water transfers are treated under the law . The smallest inju-
ries could result in the denial of a transfer application, but 
farmers need no approval to change to crops that could 
cause far greater injuries to existing users .
Allowing parties to transfer consumptive use amounts, 
without regard to the relatively minor injuries that such 
transfers might cause, would help address the definitional 
problem with water rights that exists under the current sys-
tem, and could easily be accomplished in accordance with 
property rights principles . The courts have consistently 
recognized the power of government agencies to impose 
modest constraints on the use of property without having 
to compensate the property owner for any possible loss of 
value .57 The ability of government agencies to impose such 
limits on the use of private water rights should be especially 
clear in the context of a resource where the property owner 
has only a use right and where the corpus of the right is 
held by the state in trust for the people .58
The difficulties inherent in transferring water in the 
West have the unfortunate effect of increasing the price of 
the limited supplies of water that are readily available for 
transfer . This can be seen from the ease with which CBT 
units are traded and the extraordinarily high price that 
these units command in the marketplace .59 From 2007-
2009, there were 353 permanent transfers in the western 
United States .60 Of those transfers, 61% or 216 transfers 
involved CBT units in Colorado .61 Put another way, more 
than 60% of all transfer activity involved a single project 
that represents a tiny fraction of total allocated water rights 
in the western states . Prices for CBT units purchased in 
Colorado from 2007-2009 were also among the highest 
56 . See City of Thornton v . Bijou Irrigation Co ., 926 P .2d 1 (Colo . 1996); Bin-
ning v . Miller, 102 P .2d 54 (Wyo . 1940); Department of Ecology v . U .S . 
Bureau of Reclamation, 827 P .2d 275 (Wash . 1992) .
57 . See,e.g., supra note 7 .
58 . See, e.g., Colo . Const . art . XVI, §5; Idaho Const . art . XV, §1, Cal . 
Const . art . X, §5; Wyo . Const . art . I, §31 .
59 . See Booker et al ., supra note 6, at 208 (“Gardner and Miller [1983]  .  .  . 
found that while most CBT shares at the time were held by agricultural 
users, prices fully reflected expected values to future municipal and indus-
trial buyers .”) .
60 . There were 135 permanent transfers in the West in 2007 . Eighty-seven of 
these involved CBT units . 2007AnnualTransactionReview, Water Strate-
gist, Feb . 2008, at 11-15 . In 2008, there were 116 permanent transfers; 69 
involved CBT units . 2008AnnualTransactionReview, Water Strategist, 
Feb . 2009, at 8-12 . In 2009, there were 102 permanent transfers in the 
western states; 60 involved CBT units . 2009 AnnualTransaction Review, 
Water Strategist, Feb . 2010, at 9-13 .
61 . Id.
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recorded for permanent transfers in western states .62 The 
relative paucity of these transfers calls into question the 
adequacy of the public’s information about the true price 
of water .
If the only consequence of the market failure in water 
resources was that municipal residents were forced to pay 
a higher price for their water, this might be considered an 
acceptable outcome . But the consequences are far more 
serious, especially in terms of environmental impacts . 
When a city decides that it needs to secure additional water 
resources, it has several options . First, and perhaps most 
importantly, it can embark on a water conservation pro-
gram to reduce per capita consumption .63 Second, it can 
purchase senior water rights (or farmlands that include 
senior water rights) and begin the process of transferring 
that water to municipal use .64 As previously noted, this 
can be a long and expensive process with an uncertain 
outcome . Third, it can look to developing new sources of 
water, either from groundwater or water storage projects .65 
Groundwater is not always available and may not be a 
62 . In 2007, CBT units were purchased from $9,215-$10,500/unit ($11,519-
$13,125/AF) on average . 2007AnnualTransactionReview, supra note 60, 
at 18 . These prices were significantly higher than recorded prices for per-
manent transfers in most western states . Id. at 11-15 . Examples of prices 
in other western states include purchases of pumping rights to Edwards 
Aquifer in Texas for $5,000/AF and non-irrigation water rights in Arizona 
for $1,200-$2,000/AF . Id. at 11, 15 . In 2008, average CBT prices ranged 
from $9,215-$9,716/unit ($13,164-$13,880/AF), excluding certain No-
vember transactions because their price was negotiated in 2002 . 2008An-
nualTransactionReport, supra note 60, at 16 . In Texas, pumping rights for 
the Edwards Aquifer again sold for $5,000/AF and non-irrigation water 
rights in Arizona sold for $1,200-$2,000/AF . Id. at 16 . Prices ranged from 
$1,800-$3,650/AF in California in the Mojave River Basin . Id. CBT units 
in 2009 sold for $7,133-$10,000/unit ($8,916-$12,500/AF) on average . 
2009AnnualTransactionReview, supra note 60, at 16 . In Texas, rights to 
the Edwards Aquifer sold for $5,400-$6,500/AF . Id. at 16 . Non-irrigation 
rights in Arizona sold for $1,000-$2,000/AF . Id. Prices in the Mojave River 
Basin of California ranged from $400-$3,841 . Id. CBT units are converted 
to acre-feet using a quota set each year by the NCWCD . The quota was 
80% in 2007 and 2009, and 70% in 2008 . SeeNewsReleases&Policies, 
Northern Colorado Water Conservancy District, availableat http://www .
ncwcd .org/news_information/news_release .asp . In setting the initial quota 
each October and resetting the following April, the Board takes into ac-
count water availability and need in the region . Since CBT water is designed 
as a supplemental water supply, the Board looks at native water supplies and 
local storage during the quota setting process . See Northern Colorado Water 
Conservancy District, Water Conservation and Management Plan, 3 (2004) 
[hereinafter NCWCD Management Plan], availableat http://www .ncwcd .
org/ncwcd_about/pdf/cons_plan .pdf .
63 . See Kenney, supra note 8, at 15-20, comparing costs of conservation pro-
grams, water transfers, and water development projects . Study finds that 
conservation is the cheapest option . Id. at 21 .
64 . See notes 22-24 and accompanying text . Seealso Kenney, supra note 8, 
at 11-12 (assessing the relative costs of water transfers to other water 
supply options) .
65 . Both groundwater and storage projects have found little success in the past 
20 years . Seegenerally Nichols & Kenney, supra note 4, at 427-28 . American 
Water Development, Inc ., was defeated in its attempt to tap and export 
200,000 acre-feet of groundwater from beneath land it owned in the San 
Luis Valley as it was determined to be tributary groundwater . American 
Water Dev ., Inc . v . City of Alamosa, 874 P .2d 352, 358 (Colo . 1994) . Ad-
ditionally, new development of water storage projects is considered by most 
commentators to be nearly impossible because of environmental and area-
of-origin considerations . See,e.g., Nichols & Kenney, supra note 4, at 447 
(claiming that any new development will be small-scale and “unconven-
tional” reservoirs) .
secure, long-term resource .66 Moreover, much groundwater 
is hydrologically connected to surface water, and thus often 
leads to conflicts with senior surface water users .67
Water storage, often with water from remote water 
basins, has historically proved to be a reliable source for 
new water resources, but it can also be very expensive . To 
justify construction of new projects, a city typically com-
pares the cost of building and operating the project to other 
options, including the costs associated with buying, trans-
ferring, and delivering water from existing users . If the cost 
of transferring water is inflated well beyond the true mar-
ket price, water development looks far more reasonable .68
Suppose, for example, that a city decides it needs to 
secure an additional 10,000 acre-feet of water to satisfy 
its projected demands . If the price for water in a dysfunc-
tional market is currently $10,000/acre-foot (including 
delivery costs) then, assuming that operation and main-
tenance costs are comparable, the city will likely opt to 
transfer water rights only if the cost of a project to produce 
that water is more than $100 million—the cost of pur-
chasing and transferring 10,000 acre-feet of water rights . 
If the true market price for water, however, is $1,000 per 
acre-foot, then a city would be justified in pursuing the 
project only if the project could be built for less than $10 
million .69 Perhaps more importantly, if the city is not sure 
how much water it will get from the proposed transfer, or 
how long it will take to consummate the transfer, the city 
might reasonably opt to build the project, even if it is pro-
66 . Although most groundwater aquifers do have a certain level of recharge 
or replenishment, the rate is significantly slow, and therefore, groundwa-
ter resources are usually considered nonrenewable . See, e.g., World Bank, 
Sustainable Groundwater Management: Concepts andTools, Briefing Note 
11, 1 (2002), availableat cap-net .org/sites/cap-net .org/files/wtr_mngmnt_
tls/38_GWMate11 .pdf; see also Peter D . Nichols et al ., Water and 
Growth in Colorado: A Review of Legal and Policy Issues 99, 103 
(2001) (explaining that in Colorado, tributary groundwater is treated like 
surface waters under the prior appropriation system and that non-tributary 
groundwater can only be permanent source of water supply if withdrawals 
are limited to the recharge rate) .
67 . See,e.g., American Water Dev ., Inc . v . City of Alamosa, 874 P .2d 352, 357, 
359, 368 (Colo . 1994); Kobobel v . State, Dept . of Natural Resources, 249 
P .3d 1127, 1136 (Colo . 2011); Three Bells Ranch Associates v . Cache La 
Poudre Water Users Ass’n, 758 P .2d 164, 169-70 (Colo . 1988) .
68 . Nichols & Kenney, supra note 4, at 421-22:
[M]unicipalities such as Colorado Springs, Pueblo, Pueblo West, 
and Aurora now own almost all of the water from the Twin Lakes 
project located south of Leadville, a trans-basin project originally 
designed to serve irrigation interests . Shares sell for $10,000 to 
$15,000, a price dramatically higher than the cost of native Ar-
kansas River water . Yet, buying shares of trans-basin water for mu-
nicipal use makes better economic sense than buying native water 
since it is generally possible to unilaterally change the use without 
the uncertainty or risk of water court . CBT shares exhibit a simi-
lar trend . Municipal water providers concerned about water court 
costs to convert native water dramatically bid up the price of CBT 
units . Weighted CBT prices rose steadily from around $3,600 per 
acre-foot in June 1996 to nearly $26,000 per acre-foot in April 
2000 . In contrast, competing native irrigation water sells for $500 
to $1,000 per acre-foot, depending on location .
69 . See, e.g., U .S . Army Corps of Engineers, Omaha District, Northern Inte-
gratedSupplyProjectDEIS, ES-6 (Apr . 2008), availableat https://www .nwo .
usace .army .mil/html/od-tl/eis/nisp .deis .apr08 .pdf . No-action alternative, 
which would involve acquiring the water from CBT, would cost an esti-
mated $830,500,000 . This is significantly more than the other proposed 
alternatives, all of which involve major water development projects .
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jected to cost more to ensure that needed water resources 
are secured .
While water transfers can have adverse environmental 
impacts,70 limiting transfers to the existing consumptive 
use, i .e ., the amount that has historically been consumed 
by the existing user, and restricting transfers to the basin 
of origin, would largely guarantee that such environmen-
tal impacts would be relatively modest . By contrast, water 
development projects, especially those that draw water 
from remote water basins, are far more likely to impose 
serious environmental damage .71 These damages may be 
justified by the costs and benefits associated with the proj-
ects as compared to the alternatives . But when the water 
transfer alternative is based upon the significantly inflated 
costs of a dysfunctional market, environmentalists and 
economic conservatives alike can fairly question whether 
a more rational approach to water transfers should be fash-
ioned . Suggestions for reforming current law and practices 
to overcome the problems identified in this section are set 
out in a later section of this Article . And, as already noted, 
relatively minor changes to existing law could correct some 
of the most troubling flaws in the current system and help 
to promote a truly free and flourishing water market .
One additional but important advantage of defining 
water rights in terms of consumptive use is the funda-
mental way that it changes incentives for farmers . Under 
current law, a farmer’s incentive is to grow the most water-
consumptive crop possible, especially if that farmer is even 
remotely contemplating a possible future transfer of the 
water right . This is because the transfer amount will likely 
be limited to the amount of water historically consumed .72 
If however, a water right is defined in terms of its consump-
tive use, the farmer has the opposite incentive .
Consider, for example, a farmer who has historically 
grown alfalfa on 100 acres of land . That farmer would 
typically consume about193 acre-feet of water in north-
eastern Colorado .73 If the law defined that farmer’s water 
right as the full 193 acre-feet of water consumed by the 
alfalfa crop, that farmer would have a powerful incentive to 
switch to a less water-intensive crop, so as to be able to sell 
the remaining right . Growing sunflowers, for example, in 
northeastern Colorado would consume about 134 acre-feet 
of water .74 Thus, the farmer could continue to farm, albeit 
with a different crop, while at the same time realizing a 
70 . See, e.g., Morris Israel & Jay R . Lund, Recent CaliforniaWaterTransfers:
Implications forWater Management, 35 Nat . Resources J . 1, 13 (1995) 
(explaining environmental impacts of California’s water banks) .
71 . See,e.g., U .S . Army Corps of Engineers, Omaha District, MoffatCollection
SystemProject (MoffatProject)DraftEIS (Oct . 2009), available at http://
www .nwo .usace .army .mil/html/od-tl/eis/moffat-deis-docs .html; U .S . Fish 
and Wildlife Service comment to RWSP EIS Public Scoping Summary 
Report, available at http://www .nwo .usace .army .mil/html/od-tl/eis/rwsp .
scoping .comment .2009 .fed .pdf; Northern Integrated Supply Project DEIS, 
supra note 69 .
72 . See,e.g., Wyo . Stat . §41-3-104(a) (2010); seealso Orr v . Arapahoe, 753 P .2d 
1217, 1224 (Colo . 1988) .
73 . AReviewoftheLikelyAgriculturalImpactsFromtheNorthernIntegratedSup-
plyProject, n .7 . Seealso Antony Frank & David Carlson, Colorado’s Net Ir-
rigation Requirements for Agriculture tbl . 1, Colorado Dept . of Agriculture 
(1995) .
74 . Id.
significant profit from selling the water saved as a result of 
the crop switch .
IV. Water Transfers That Work
The possibilities for and obstacles to water transfers can 
best be understood by reviewing the circumstances that 
have facilitated transfers in the past . For several reasons, 
the opportunities for simple and efficient transfers are par-
ticularly good for the many water districts and mutual 
ditch companies that operate throughout the western 
United States . First, the water rights for many of these 
entities were approved for a wide range of uses over a rel-
atively large geographic area . Thus, a “transfer” of water 
within the district from one approved use to another does 
not generally require a formal application or approval pro-
cess . Second, a substantial portion of the water rights for 
these entities are associated with storage reservoirs, which 
greatly increases management flexibility . Once water is 
stored, it is free from the “call of the river,”75 and it can 
be quickly and easily sold within the project area for any 
of the uses for which is was originally approved . Finally, 
many of these entities have elaborate delivery systems that 
allow the water to be distributed over a large portion of 
the project area with only modest infrastructure improve-
ments . Existing projects involving permanent and tempo-
rary transfers in the West offer a window into developing 
more robust water markets .
A.	 Permanent	Transfers
The CBT project may be the most studied water project 
anywhere in the world, in part because of its remarkable 
success in achieving a robust market for its water resourc-
es .76 In 1929, the Colorado State Engineer, the Platte Val-
ley Water Conservation League, and the U .S . Army Corps 
of Engineers sponsored a study that found that the water 
resources in the South Platte Basin were insufficient to 
75 . A call of the river allows senior water rights holders to require junior water 
rights holders upstream to curtail use if senior rights holders are not receiv-
ing their entitled portion due to low stream flow . See Charles W . Howe, 
WaterLawandEconomics:AnAssessmentofRiverCallsandtheSouthPlatte
WellShut-Down, 12 U . Denv . Water L . Rev . 181, 181-82 (2008) .
76 . See, e.g., Daniel Tyler, The LastWater Hole in theWest: The Colorado-Big
Thompson Project and the Northern Colorado Water Conservancy District 
(1992); David S . Brookshire et al ., MarketPricesforWaterintheSemiarid
WestoftheUnitedStates, Water Resources Res . 40 (2004); Janis M . Carey 
& David L . Sunding, EmergingMarketsinWater:AComparativeInstitution-
alAnalysisoftheCentralValleyandColorado-BigThompsonProjects . 41 Nat . 
Res . J . 283 (2001); Raymond L . Anderson, WindfallGainsFromTransfersof
WaterAllotmentsWithintheColorado-BigThompsonProject, 43 Land Econ . 
265 (1989); Charles W . Howe, ProjectBenefitsandCostsFromNationaland
RegionalViewpoints:MethodologicalIssuesandCaseStudyoftheColorado-Big
ThompsonProject, 27 Nat . Resources J . 5 (1987); MarketActivityinSouth-
westernStates, in Saliba & Bush, supra note 40, at 116-21 (1987); Charles 
W . Howe et al ., InnovationsinWaterManagement:LessonsFromtheColora-
do-BigThompsonProjectandNorthernColoradoWaterConservancyDistrict, 
in Scarce Water and Institutional Change, 171-200 (1986); Charles 
W . Howe et al ., InnovativeApproachestoWaterAllocation:ThePotentialfor
WaterMarkets, Water Resources Res . 22 (4), 439-45 (1986); WaterOr-
ganizations:TheNorthernColoradoWaterConservancyDistrict, in Hartman 
& Seastone, supra note 6; J .M . Dille, A Brief History of Northern 
Colorado and the Colorado-Big Thompson Project (1958) .
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canals, and pipelines that divert and disperse the water to 
users throughout northeastern Colorado .88 A number of 
reservoirs store the CBT flows on the eastern slope, and 
the system forks to the north and south, tying distribu-
tion into South Platte River tributaries from the Cache la 
Poudre River to Boulder Creek .89 The CBT system has a 
total storage capacity of 925,456 acre-feet, with the major-
ity of its western slope capacity held within Lake Granby 
(539,758 acre-feet), and the Front Range capacity primarily 
coming from Horsetooth Reservoir (156,735 acre-feet) and 
Carter Lake (112,230 acre-feet) .90 With 75,000 acre-feet of 
dead storage, Lake Granby can hold over two years of CBT 
water in active storage .91
A hallmark of the CBT project is the ease with which 
shares are bought and sold and the variety of uses for which 
they are approved . Transactions occur wholly within the 
NCWCD, so approval by the Colorado water court is not 
required .92 CBT transfers are relatively straightforward, 
inexpensive, and require little time (two-three months) in 
comparison to typical water transfers .93 Therefore, it is easy 
to acquire CBT rights quickly .94 The CBT project illus-
trates generally the enormous value of a free and open mar-
ket for water . If water rights can be defined not merely as 
an amount available for withdrawal, but also in terms of 
the amount of water consumed by the current use, and if 
that consumptive use can be converted to a presumptively 
marketable quantity of water, then the prospect exists for a 
truly open and robust water market that has the potential 
to reduce the price of water and make water shortages a 
thing of the past .
A less obvious but additional lesson that can be gleaned 
from the CBT experience is the importance of access by 
water buyers and sellers to the elaborate distribution sys-
tems that typically characterize publicly financed water 
projects . Municipal and industrial usage has gradually 
increased since 1958, and 66% of CBT units are now 
owned by municipal and industrial users .95 However, 
approximately 60% of the actual deliveries are still used by 
88 . Id.
89 . See U .S . Bureau of Reclamation, Project Details—Colorado Big-Thomp-
son Project—Facility Descriptions, http://www .usbr .gov/projects/Project .
jsp?proj_Name=Colorado-Big+Thompson+Project (last visited July 26, 
2012) .
90 . Northern Colorado Water Conservation District, Colorado-Big Thompson
Project:InterpretiveArea, availableat http://www .ncwcd .org/news_informa-
tion/web_news/Publications/Interpretive%20area .pdf .
91 . See U .S . Geological Survey, 09018500LAKEGRANBYNEARGRANBY,
CO, http://pubs .usgs .gov/wdr/wdr-co-03-1/vol2/html/09018500 .2003 .sw .
html; seealso Interview with Don Carlson and Brian Werner, NCWCD, in 
Berthoud, Colo . (July 17, 2009) (“Dead Storage” is defined as water storage 
space below the level of the spillway .) .
92 . NCWCD Management Plan, supra note 62 .
93 . W .L . Nieuwoudt, WaterMarketInstitutionsinColoradoWithPossibleLessons
forSouthAfrica, 26 Water SA 27, 30 (2000) .
94 . Interview with Don Carlson and Brian Werner, NCWCD, in Berthoud, 
Colo . (July 17, 2009) . In December 2008, CBT units sold at a price of 
$9,300/unit, when the quota set at that time yielded 0 .6 acre-feet per unit, 
Transactions:Colorado, 23 Water Strategist 1, Jan . 2009 . From 2002 to 
2008, CBT unit prices have fluctuated between approximately $9,300-
10,600/unit, Water Market Indicators: Colorado-Big Thompson Units, 23 
Water Strategist 11, 12 Nov ., Dec . 2009 .
95 . Telephone Interview with Sherri Rasmussen, Allotment Contract Specialist, 
N . Colo . Water Conservancy Dist . (July 6, 2012) .
meet the current and future supply demands for northeast-
ern Colorado .77 However, the study identified a potential 
surplus of water on the western side of the Continental 
Divide, within the headwaters of the Colorado River .78 The 
U .S . Department of the Interior Appropriation Act of 1937 
approved construction of the transmountain water diver-
sion and supply project, known as the CBT .79
Approval of the project was contingent upon the forma-
tion of a public water district in Colorado to contract with 
the U .S . government for repayment of the project costs .80 
The Colorado Water Conservancy Act81 authorized a dis-
trict court to organize a conservancy district upon petition 
of a stipulated number of property owners .82 Landown-
ers subsequently created the Northern Colorado Water 
Conservancy District (NCWCD) and designated it as 
a public agency authorized to contract with the United 
States for the development and management of the CBT 
system and its water supply .83 According to the NCWCD 
Water Conservation and Management Plan, “[t]he Dis-
trict’s primary purpose is to provide supplemental water 
for agricultural, municipal, domestic, and industrial uses 
in northeastern Colorado .”84
What makes this project so important for the study of 
water transfers is that the 310,000 CBT shares that rep-
resent water rights are freely marketable over the entire 
District—a vast geographic area that includes all of the 
urban areas along the Front Range of Colorado from 
Broomfield to Fort Collins .85 The project also includes a 
large collection and distribution system that encompasses 
12 reservoirs, 35 miles of tunnels, and 95 miles of canals .86 
A series of pumps move water up from Lake Granby to 
Shadow Mountain Reservoir, which then flows into Grand 
Lake, all on the western slope of Colorado .87 From there, 
the 13 .1-mile-long Alva B . Adams Tunnel carries Colo-
rado River water under the Continental Divide to tunnels, 
77 . U .S . Bureau of Reclamation, ProjectDetails—Colorado-BigThompsonProj-
ect—Development—History 9, available at http://www .usbr .gov/projects/
Project .jsp?proj_Name=Colorado-Big+Thompson+Project .
78 . Id.
79 . Robert Autobee, Colorado-Big Thompson Project, Bureau of Reclamation 
History Program, Research on Historic Reclamation Projects 3, 10,(1996), 
available at http://www .usbr .gov/projects//ImageServer?imgName=Doc_
1303159857902 .pdf .
80 . Id. at 11 .
81 . Colo . Rev . Stat . Ann . §§37-45-101 et seq . (2010) .
82 . Id. §§108-09 .
83 . Id.; seealso NCWCD Management Plan, supra note 62 .
84 . NCWCD Management Plan, supra note 62, at 3 (“The water is used to 
alleviate the critical shortages that have hampered and restricted the cultiva-
tion of fertile lands in the South Platte River Valley .”); see U .S . Bureau of 
Reclamation, Project Details—Colorado-Big Thompson Project—Benefits—
Municipal and Industrial, http://www .usbr .gov/projects/Project .jsp?proj_
Name=Colorado-Big+Thompson+Project (11 communities now receive full 
or supplemental use from the project); seealso Autobee, supra note 79, at 12 
(“[The project] provide[s] water to existing farmlands and was not designed 
to reclaim uncultivated land .”) .
85 . The NCWCD serves a population of approximately 750,000 and delivers 
an average of 220,000 acre-feet per year to more than 100 ditch, reservoir, 
and irrigation companies, and 32 municipalities . For a description of the 
geographic area encompassed by the District, see NCWCD Management 
Plan, supra note 62, at 3 .
86 . Northern Colorado Water Conservancy District, Colorado-Big Thompson
Project, http://www .ncwcd .org/project_features/cbt_main .asp .
87 . Id.
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agriculture,96 which lease water from municipal sharehold-
ers, especially during the drier months of the later sum-
mer .97 As noted above, the NCWCD has built an elaborate 
distribution system that could potentially facilitate trans-
fers of non-NCWCD water if others had fair access to the 
NCWCD system . California requires water utilities to pro-
vide access to other water distributors when the utility has 
excess capacity,98 and such legislation should be encour-
aged throughout the West .
Despite the success of the CBT market, the high price 
paid for CBT water points to the failure of water markets . 
CBT water represents only a small fraction of the water 
used in northeastern Colorado,99 and the limited supply 
of this easily transferable water resource has pushed up its 
price . The policies of the NCWCD have also contributed 
to the supply problem by limiting municipal purchases to 
80% of CBT shares .100 If other water resources within the 
CBT service area were more easily bought and sold, and 
if access to the NCWCD’s distribution system was more 
readily available at a fair price to other water buyers and 
sellers, one could imagine a far more robust market with 
the ability to buy and sell water at much lower prices .
B.	 Temporary	Transfers
Temporary water transfers or water-leasing programs also 
hold promise for moving more water to urban communi-
ties while protecting rural areas that may otherwise face 
the prospect of losing water rights permanently . In par-
ticular, excellent opportunities exist to support rotational 
fallowing programs, water banking, and interruptible sup-
ply agreements, or “dry year options .”101 The advantage 
96 . NCWCD Delivery Database, CBTProjectDeliveries (June 16, 2009) (on 
file with author) .
97 . See NCWCD Carryover Capacity Transferability Program, Rules 3 (Aug . 
2004), available at http://www .ncwcd .org/news_information/web_news/
LatestNews/CCTP .pdf .
98 . Cal . Water Code §§1810-1814 (2011); While these water wheeling stat-
utes are helpful, they have been criticized recently for inadequately defining 
(1) what “unused capacity” means and how it is determined under the stat-
ute, (2) what “fair compensation” is, and (3) the rights of parties attempting 
to wheel water of a substantially different quality than the agency’s water . See 
Gray, supra note 23, at 33 .
99 . CBT water use accounts for approximately 260,000 acre-feet annually, while 
groundwater use alone in northeastern Colorado is estimated at 880,000 
acre-feet . See United States Bureau of Reclamation, ProjectDetails—Colora-
do-BigThompsonProject—Plan, availableat http://www .usbr .gov/projects/
Project .jsp?proj_Name=Colorado-Big+Thompson+Project; see also Colo-
rado Dept . of Natural Resources, InterimWater Supply and Needs Report
for the South Platte Basin and Denver/South Metro Counties, available at 
http://cwcb .state .co .us/water-management/basin-roundtables/Documents/ 
SouthPlatte/MetroSPInterimBasinWaterSupplyNeedsReport .pdf .
100 . Interview with Don Carlson and Brian Werner, NCWCD, in Berthoud, 
Colo . (July 17, 2009) .
101 . Rotational fallowing programs give farmers the option to fallow a portion of 
their land . The unused water from the fallowed land can then be leased to 
municipalities . Colo . Water Conservation Bd ., Alternative Agricul-
tural Transfer Methods Grant Program Study 5 (May 2011), avail-
able at http://cwcb .state .co .us/water-management/water-supply-planning/
Pages/main .aspx . Interruptible water supply agreements or dry year options 
allow municipalities to contract with farmers for water during dry years, 
thereby allowing municipalities to avoid more costly permanent water sup-
ply agreements . See generally Michael O’Donnell, & Bonnie Colby, Dry-
YearWaterSupplyReliabilityContracts:AToolforWaterManagers, Univ . of 
Arizona Dept . of Agricultural and Resource Economics (Oct . 2009), avail-
of these programs is that they allow agricultural sellers to 
retain ownership and control over water rights, even as the 
water is made available for municipal use .102
The rotational fallowing program that was pioneered 
by the Palo Verde Irrigation District (PVID) of southern 
California in its agreement with the Metropolitan Water 
District (MWD) offers a particularly useful model for 
studying temporary transfers . In 1991, the MWD initi-
ated a two-year pilot program with the PVID to reduce 
the area’s use of the Colorado River while promoting a sus-
tainable rural economy .103 Under the test program, 20,215 
acres were voluntarily fallowed by farmers for annual pay-
ments of $620 per acre . The payments totaled $25 mil-
lion over the two-year period, with approximately 93,000 
acre-feet of water stored in Lake Mead and made available 
to the U .S . Bureau of Reclamation . While the region suf-
fered a modest job loss of 1 .3%, property and sales taxes 
were not affected . The success of the pilot program led to 
a more permanent arrangement . Farmers must make a 
long-term commitment to the program, but they are paid 
for each acre of land fallowed .104 Currently, PVID grow-
ers fallow between 7% and 35% of their land annually,105 
providing between 25,000 and 111,000 acre-feet of water 
to the MWD each year, which uses existing infrastructure 
to deliver the water to urban customers .106
The success of the MWD/PVID program stirred 
interest among several mutual ditch companies in the 
Lower Arkansas River Basin of Colorado .107 In Novem-
ber 2002, voters in the Arkansas Valley agreed to form 
the Lower Arkansas Valley Water Conservancy District 
(LAVWCD) .108 Although most conservancy districts are 
organized to develop water resources, the LAVWCD’s 
mission is to ensure the continued availability of water 
resources and the long-term economic viability of the 
ableat http://ag .arizona .edu/arec/pubs/facultypubs/ewsr-dyo-Final-5-12-10 .
pdf . Water banking involves the selling of stored water or storage capacity 
to parties interested in purchasing that water, often for use at a more conve-
nient time and place . AnalysisofWaterBanksintheWesternStates, Washing-
ton Dept . of Ecology (2004) [hereinafter AnalysisofWaterBanks], available
at http://www .ecy .wa .gov/pubs/0411011 .pdf . This excellent report offers a 
detailed discussion of the various approaches to water banking, along with a 
comprehensive survey of water banks in the western United States .
102 . The Super Ditch Company’s Articles of Incorporation provide that its irriga-
tors can participate in water banking, interruptible supply agreements, and 
water banking . See Articles of Incorporation of the Lower Arkansas Super 
Ditch Company ¶ 3 .2(a) (May 7, 2008) [hereinafter Articles of Incorpora-
tion], §2 .1 .
103 . Field Hearing at LaQuinta, California, on the Implementation of the Cali-
fornia Plan for the Colorado River—Opportunities and Challenges Before 
the Subcommittee on Water and Power of the House Resources Committee 
on Natural Resources, 107th Cong . 1-2 (2002) (Addendum to the testi-
mony of Phillip J . Pace, Chairman, Metro . Water Dist . of S . Cal .) .
104 . Colo . Water Conservation Bd ., Dep’t of Natural Res ., The State-




107 . Jay Winner & Mary Lou Smith, Colorado’s“SuperDitch”:CanFarmersCo-
operatetoMakeLemonadeOutofLemons?, Report to the U .S . Committee 
on Irrigation and Drainage 6 (Mar . 30, 2008) [hereinafter Winner] .
108 . See The Lower Arkansas Valley Water Conservation Dist . History, http://
www .lavwcd .org/history .html .
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Lower Arkansas Valley .109 The District hired an engineer-
ing firm to conduct a feasibility study on a water-leasing 
program in the Arkansas Basin .110 The study made pre-
liminary estimates of the quantity of water available for 
leasing and identified potential ditch companies to partici-
pate in the program .111 The seven ditch companies that fit 
the qualities necessary for the program included Bessemer 
Ditch, Rocky Ford Highline Canal, Oxford Farmers Ditch, 
Otero Canal, Catlin Canal, Holbrook Canal, Fort Lyon 
Storage Canal, and Fort Lyon Canal .112 The still evolving 
proposal in the Lower Arkansas Valley, often described as 
the “Super Ditch,” highlights the potential complexity of 
a temporary transfer program . The Super Ditch proposal 
is essentially a Super Ditch Company established by the 
LAVWCD to facilitate the pooling of the water resources 
of these seven ditch companies and the leasing of these 
pooled resources to municipal water suppliers, primarily 
through a system of rotational fallowing .113
The MWD/PVID program, however, has a distinct 
advantage over the Super Ditch proposal, because it pairs 
a single owner (PVID) of significant senior water rights 
with the needs of a single large water consumer .114 By 
contrast, the fallowing program proposed by the Super 
Ditch Company would involve seven ditch companies 
and a multitude of water rights, supplying water to as 
yet unknown municipalities .115 This would allow the 
LAVWCD to create an open market to lease water to 
anyone with needs in the Basin, but it requires the seller 
to aggregate multiple water rights, possibly with multiple 
buyers, thereby greatly increasing the complexity of the 
transfers and other terms of any agreement among the 
relevant parties .116 This is of particular concern, given the 
problem of high transaction costs that have long been 
associated with water transfers .117
Given the complicated nature of the Super Ditch pro-
posal, it is unsurprising that the LAVWCD has encoun-
109 . See The Lower Arkansas Valley Water Conservation Dist ., Mission, http://
www .lavwcd .org/mission .html . (The LAVWCD’s Mission Statement de-
clares that its purpose is:
To acquire, retain and conserve water flowing in the Arkansas River 
and its tributaries; to insure that all water will remain in the Val-
ley for the socio-economic benefit of the District citizens; and to 
participate in water-related projects that will embody thoughtful 
conservation, responsible growth, and beneficial water usage within 
the Lower Arkansas Valley . To further its mission, the District may, 
among other methods, accept conservation easements, with or 
without water attached, that will further the mission of the District 
and its interests .
110 . Id. at 5; seealso HDR Engineering, Inc ., Lower Arkansas Valley Water 
Leasing Potential Preliminary Feasibility Investigation, Report to 
Lower Arkansas Valley Water Conservation District (2006) [herein-
after HDR Engineering] .
111 . Id. HDR Engineering, The study analyzed natural stream flow data from 
1956 through 2004 .
112 . Id. at 2 .
113 . Alternative Agricultural Transfer Methods Grant Program Study 
5, supra note 101 .
114 . Winner, supra note 107, at 6; Telephone Interview with Jay Winner, Execu-
tive Director of the LAVWCD, in Boulder, Colo . (Aug . 13, 2009) .
115 . Id.
116 . HDR Engineering, supra note 110, at 84-85 .
117 . For a discussion of transaction costs, see notes 60-63 and accompany-
ing text .
tered a variety of legal, logistical, and political difficul-
ties .118 Among these was persuading irrigators to partici-
pate before the basic details of the program, including the 
price per acre-foot of water and the length of leases, were 
decided .119 For now, interested parties have simply been 
asked to pledge a willingness to participate contingent 
upon the final details .120
The legal problems are potentially even more daunting . 
Most importantly, the Company will have to seek judicial 
approval for each of its leases prior to changing the point 
of diversion and new use of the water right . For purposes 
of transferring water rights, Colorado law historically does 
not differentiate between temporary or long-term transfers 
or between leases and permanent transfers .121 The process 
for gaining water court approval will significantly increase 
transaction costs and could compromise the success of the 
Super Ditch proposal .
Assuming these complications can be addressed to the 
satisfaction of the parties, opportunities for rotational fal-
lowing, as well as water banking and interruptible supply 
agreements, or “dry year options,” do hold promise .122 
Rotational fallowing seems to be driving the Super Ditch 
proposal, perhaps because it is viewed as offering the great-
est potential for amassing a substantial amount of water 
that could be made available on a relatively permanent 
basis . However, the opportunities for banking and dry year 
options should not be overlooked .
Water banking in particular could hold promise, given 
the substantial storage capacity in the Arkansas Basin .123 
One could imagine, for example, an arrangement compa-
rable to that between Arizona and the Southern Nevada 
118 . For example, historically, the ditch companies involved in the Super Ditch 
Company have had trouble working together . HDR Engineering, supra 
note 110, at 109 . There are logistical hurdles in determining how shares in 
the company will be distributed to irrigators because different ditches have 
different yields and quality of water . See Articles of Incorporation, supra 
note 102, at 3 .2(b) (describing that the amount of shares disbursed will vary 
depending on the particular ditch and its historic yield and water quality) . 
Additionally, some of the ditch companies’ bylaws do not allow the ditch’s 
water to be used on lands not served by the ditch . See Winner, supra note 
107, at 7 .
119 . Chris Woodka, Roundtable Supports Study of Super Ditch, The Pueblo 
Chieftain (Sept . 13, 2007) .
120 . Winner, supra note 107, at 7 . Additionally, the LAVWCD had to address 
the practice among ditch companies of including in their bylaws clauses 
restricting the use of water to lands served directly by the ditch .
121 . Colo . Rev . Stat . Ann . §37-92-304(3 .5) . Seealso Fort Lyon Canal Co . v . 
Catlin Canal Co ., 642 P .2d 501, 506 (Colo . 1982) .
122 . The Super Ditch Company’s Articles of Incorporation provide that its irriga-
tors can participate in water banking, interruptible supply agreements, and 
water banking . See Articles of Incorporation, supra note 102, §2 .1 .
123 . The Colorado Water Conservation Board has listed the major storage fa-
cilities or projects in the Arkansas River Basin as: John Martin Reservoir 
(618,600 acre-feet); Pueblo Reservoir (357,678 acre-feet); Great Plains Res-
ervoir (265,552 acre-feet); Twin Lakes (141,000 acre-feet); Turquoise Res-
ervoir (129,440 acre-feet); Trinidad Reservoir (119,887 acre-feet); Adobe 
Creek Reservoir (71,000 acre-feet); Cuchara Valley Reservoir (40,960 acre-
feet); Lake Meredith (39,804 acre-feet); Horse Creek Reservoir (28,000 
acre-feet); Mt . Elbert Forebay (11,530 acre-feet); Clear Creek Reservoir 
(11,500 acre-feet); Lake Henry (9,500 acre-feet); St . Charles Reservoir No . 
3 (8 .638 acre-feet); Dye Reservoir (5,640 acre-feet); Holbrook Reservoir 
(4,500 acre-feet); Brush Hollow Reservoir (3,933 acre-feet); Mt . Pisgah 
Reservoir (2,471 acre-feet); and Deweese-Dye Reservoir (1,772 acre-feet) . 
Colo . Water Conservation Bd ., Dep’t of Natural Res ., The State-
wide Supply Initiative: Fact Sheet for the Arkansas Basin 1 (2006) .
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Water Authority (SNWA) whereby the SNWA sends sur-
plus water to Arizona for storage and later use in Arizona . 
In exchange, the SNWA receives credits that will allow 
it to withdraw an equivalent amount of water from Lake 
Mead .124 Similarly, a southern Front Range city could allow 
its surplus water supplies to pass by its diversion point for 
storage in an Arkansas Basin reservoir, where it could be 
made available for downstream users . The city would then 
have the opportunity to use that water in a dry year when 
it needs additional supplies .
Dry year options could also be constructed creatively to 
allow cities to take a fixed amount of agricultural water in 
dry years, either from a willing individual user or perhaps 
from an entire ditch company that might be willing to 
forego a certain percentage of its supply in a dry year . The 
remaining water could be allocated proportionally among 
mutual shareholders, or farmers could opt for more or less 
water with the payment of appropriate fees .
V. Reforming Water Transfer Law
While it can be argued persuasively that the basic structure 
of prior appropriation law requires reform,125 fundamental 
changes to that law are neither politically tenable nor nec-
essary to address the most pressing problems facing water 
resources management in the West . But modest reforms 
and new ways of thinking about western water law are nec-
essary if the West is going to meet the challenges posed 
by growing urban demand for water . Set forth below are 
several recommendations that could, if implemented, pro-
vide water resources to meet the future water needs of the 




Western water rights have historically been defined in 
terms of the amount of water diverted for a particular use 
on a particular tract of land . The amount of water con-
sumed can vary, so long as the location and type of use 
does not change . Under current state water law, consump-
124 . See The Storage and Interstate Release Agreement among the Secretary of 
the Interior; the Arizona Water Banking Authority; the Southern Nevada 
Water Authority; and the Colorado River Commission of Nevada, Contract 
No . 02-XX-30-W0406 (June 12, 2001), availableat http://www .usbr .gov/
lc/region/g4000/SIRA/finagmt .pdf; seealso Patricia Mulroy, BeyondtheDi-
vision:ACompactThatUnites, 28 J . Land Resources & Envtl . L . 105, 109 
(2008) .
125 . Charles F . Wilkinson, WesternWaterLawinTransition, 56 Colo . L . Rev . 
317, 344 (1985); Charles F . Wilkinson, Crossing the Next Meridian: 
Land, Water, and the Future of the West 21-22 (1992); Charles F . 
Wilkinson, PriorAppropriation1848-1991, 21 Envtl . L . xxix (1991); Leila 
C . Behnampour, ReformingaWesternWaterInstitution:HowExpandingthe
ProductivityofWaterRightsCouldLessenOurWaterWoes, 41 Envtl . L . 201, 
204 (2011) (explaining that the prior appropriation doctrine hinders wa-
ter conservation); Mark Honhart, Carrots forConservation:Oregon’sWater
ConservationStatuteOffersIncentivestoInvestinEfficiency, 66 U . Colo . L . 
Rev . 827, 828 (1995) (describing how the prior appropriation doctrine has 
become an obstacle to dealing with the problem of inefficient water use in 
the West) .
tive use becomes relevant only when a water user decides to 
sell the water right . At that point, the amount available for 
transfer will generally be limited to the amount of water 
historically consumed .126 State water law further prohibits 
the transfer of the consumptive amount of a water right 
if such a transfer would cause even the tiniest injury .127 
For opponents of a transfer, the no injury rule provides 
an opportunity to drag out the transfer process for many 
years at great expense to everyone involved . These high 
transaction costs stand as one of the biggest disincentives 
to water transfers .
As previously suggested, the absolute nature of the no 
injury rule as applied to water transfers is entirely at odds 
with the more flexible approaches in a raft of other areas 
of water law, such as measuring the accuracy of the diver-
sion amount or allowing water users to change to crops 
that consume more water .128 A similar flexibility should be 
embraced for water transfers, since water transfers may very 
well hold the key to addressing the water scarcity issues 
expected to arise in the future .129
Redefining western water rights in terms of both the 
diversion amount and consumptive use amount would be 
relatively simple and would not disrupt the historic opera-
tion of state water law . It would, of course, impose a mod-
est administrative burden on the state, particularly during 
the time that the state is establishing consumptive use 
amounts for existing water rights . But if the state defined 
all water rights within a basin in terms of both the diver-
sion amount and consumptive use amount, the state would 
be in the position to presumptively allow the transfer of 
that consumptive use amount, at least within the same 
water basin, subject to minimal procedure . The processes 
for defining consumptive use rights and for allowing the 
transfer of these rights require elaboration .
First, defining all water rights in a state in terms of both 
the diversion amount and consumptive use will take time, 
but it can be accomplished deliberately over a period of 
years . This will allow states to gain experience carrying out 
the task fairly and efficiently . States might begin with a 
rulemaking process to help define terms, but should prob-
ably resist trying to do much with rules in favor of learn-
ing through case-by-case adjudication, at least until the 
process is reasonably well-understood . In terms of actually 
adjudicating consumptive use amounts, there are a number 
of options . States could initially focus on the most water-
stressed basins, and gradually work toward covering all 
basins . Starting in the most water-stressed basins would 
126 . See,e.g., Cal . Water Code §1725 (2011); Idaho Code §42-222 (2011); 
Wyo . Stat . Ann . §41-3-104(a) (West 2010) .
127 . See,e.g., Colo . Rev . Stat . Ann . §37-92-305(3) (West 2011); Nev . Rev . 
Stat . §533 .370 (2010); Utah Code Ann . §73-3-3 (West 2011); Wyo . 
Stat . Ann . §41-3-104 (West 2010) .
128 . See Squillace, AccountingforWaterRightsintheWesternUnitedStates, supra 
note 54 .
129 . The focus on precision in water transfers most likely reflects the suspicions 
of early legislators about water transfers . By making it difficult to transfer 
water, the law minimized the concerns that early water applicants were hop-
ing to sell excess water that they might be able to acquire . See,e.g., Elwood 
Mead, Irrigation Institutions 264 (1903) .
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facilitate water transfers in the basins that would benefit 
the most from them . Alternatively, a state might choose to 
begin with a small basin that is not facing any particular 
water shortage in order to obtain a better understanding 
of possible challenges it might face when tackling a more 
complex basin . A third, and perhaps the most practical 
option, would be to begin with one or more water districts 
or mutual ditch companies in a given basin, since these 
entities generally hold large water rights that could be adju-
dicated more efficiently . Moreover, they might be in the 
best position to pool a significant amount of water for sale 
to a municipal supplier .130
The initial consumptive decisions should be made in 
draft form by the appropriate state official, such as the State 
Engineer, who could work in cooperation with a state agri-
cultural school . Many of these schools have already done 
the pioneering work in determining water consumption by 
crops in different water basins .131 This work focuses on dif-
ferent types of basins throughout western states .132
Unlike traditional water rights, which are often defined 
in terms of a flow right, consumptive use rights would 
always be defined in terms of volume of water, probably 
acre-feet . The owner of the water right and other interested 
members of the public should be afforded an opportunity 
to comment on the draft consumptive use decisions . States 
could minimize the opportunities for objections by autho-
rizing the state agency to treat crop and soil-types some-
what generically . This would allow states to cover large 
tracts of land fairly quickly, especially where scientific data 
is already available .
130 . As suggested below, water supply organizations are probably in the best po-
sition to mimic the success of the CBT water market . They will be in a bet-
ter position to do this if the law makes it easier to transfer consumptive use 
amounts . Seeinfra notes 141-43 and accompanying text .
131 . See,e.g., José Luis Chávez et al ., RemoteSensingETofAlfalfaUsingaSurface
AerodynamicTemperatureModel, 5th National Decennial Irrigation Confer-
ence Proceedings (2010); Bruce A . Lytle et al ., AWin-WinScenarioforUr-
ban-RuralWaterSupplies, The Water Report, Feb . 2008, availableat http://
www .lytlewater .com/waterreport0208 .pdf . Seealso Save the Poudre Coali-
tion, AReviewoftheLikelyAgriculturalImpactsFromtheNorthernIntegrated
SupplyProject, app . A (Sept . 7, 2008), availableat http://www .savethepou-
dre .org/docs/stp_ag_impacts_analysis .pdf, citing the U .S . Department of 
Agriculture 2002 Census of Agriculture, availableat http://www .agcensus .
usda .gov/ and U .S . Department of Agriculture, National Agricultural Sta-
tistics Service, availableat http://www .nass .usda .gov/ . Seealso New Mexico 
Water Use by Categories, 2005 (describing the Blaney-Criddle Method and 
the Modified Blaney-Criddle Method for determining consumptive irriga-
tion requirements), available at http://www .ose .state .nm .us/PDF/Publica-
tions/Library/TechnicalReports/TechReport-052 .pdf .
132 . See,e.g., Ahmed E . Al-Juaidi, WaterAllocationforAgriculturalUseConsider-
ingTreatedWastewater,PublicHealthRisk,andEconomicIssues, 33 Utah State 
Univ . (2009), available at http://digitalcommons .usu .edu/cgi/viewcon-
tent .cgi?article=1250&context=etd&sei-redir=1#search=%22crops%20
water%20consumption%22 (Discussing Utah’s Bear River Valley Basin); 
seealso Colo . Water Conservation Bd ., AlternativeAgriculturalWater
TransferMethodsGrantProgramSummary, 8 tbl . 1 (2011); see,e.g., Timo-
thy K . Gates et al ., TowardOptimalWaterManagementinColorado’sLower
ArkansasRiverValley, Colorado Water Resources Research Institute Com-
pletion Report No . 205 (2006), available at http://www .cwi .colostate .
edu/publications/cr/205 .pdf; see,e.g., Amber Kirkpatrick et al ., APractical
GuidetoChoosingCropsWell-SuitedtoLimitedIrrigation, Irrigating With 
Limited Water Supplies (2006), availableat http://region8water .colostate .
edu/PDFs/Irrigating%20with%20Limited%20Water%20Supplies .pdf 
(estimating water consumptive use of select crops in Montana, Colorado, 
and Utah) .
Challenges to these consumptive use determinations 
could be limited to: (1) whether the agency used the best 
scientific information in making its judgment; (2) whether 
a particular tract of land fits the soil profile used to make 
the decision; and (3) whether the crop chosen to estimate 
historic consumptive use accurately reflects that land’s 
historical cropping pattern . Regarding this last point, the 
legislation might place the burden on the agricultural user 
of demonstrating to the appropriate state official the his-
toric farming practices on the particular tract of land . The 
legislation might also clarify the meaning of historic prac-
tices, perhaps by setting out the historic period subject to 
review, and the number of years necessary to show historic 
use for growing a particular crop . Alternatively, the appro-
priate state agency could adopt rules describing how it will 
determine historic practices and other issues that might be 
raised in the proceeding .
Once the consumptive use judgments are final, the 
owners of those rights would be free to sell all or any por-
tion of the consumptive use amount . It might be wise, 
however, to build into the legislation a provision that sub-
jects each transfer to a 10% reduction to protect stream 
flows and to help account for any errors in the system . To 
satisfy due process concerns, the proposed transfer should 
still include a notification and decision process, but objec-
tors should not be allowed to complain about the origi-
nal consumptive use judgment that was made during the 
basin review process .
While at first blush, farmers might be suspicious of 
a streamlined water transfer process, it potentially offers 
them a way to profit from their substantial agricultural 
water rights while continuing to farm . Returning to an 
earlier example, if a farmer in northeastern Colorado 
receives a consumptive use declaration of 193 acre-feet 
of water for 100 acres of land on which the farmer his-
torically grew alfalfa,133 that farmer might be willing to 
switch to a crop such as soybeans, which consumes only 
122 acre-feet of water .134 This would allow the farmer 
to sell the remaining 71 acre-feet, even while continu-
ing to farm . The state would have to verify the change 
in crop, and ensure that the farmer does not revert to a 
more water-consumptive crop in the future . Eventually, 
advances in satellite imaging technology should make 
it possible to monitor the type of crop being grown by 
farmers at a relatively low cost .135
133 . Antony Frank & David Carlson, Colorado’s Net Irrigation Requirements 
for Agriculture tbl . 1, Colorado Dept . of Agriculture (1995) (figures for 
Weld County), available at http://cospl .coalliance .org/fez/eserv/co:3072/
ag92ir71999internet .pdf .
134 . Id.
135 .See, e.g.,AGuide to thePracticalUse ofAerialColor-InfraredPhotography
inAgricultureAgriculturalApplicationsofColor-InfraredFilm, Univ . of Ne-
braska-Lincoln, Virtual Nebraska, Education Module, availableat http://
www .casde .unl .edu/activities/cir-uses/applications/crop-inventory .php . See 
also Ping Zhang et al ., Potential Monitoring of Crop Production Using a 
Satellite-Based Climate-Variability Impact Index, Agric . & Forest Meteorol-
ogy 132 (2005), availableat http://cybele .bu .edu/download/manuscripts/
zhping02 .pdf (detailing the potential agricultural capabilities of different 
types of imaging satellites and noting that currently, historical data and vi-
sual inspection are necessary to supplement satellite data .) . Seealso Stephan 
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Even greater savings might be realized if the farmer 
were to limit an alfalfa crop to one or perhaps two cut-
tings each year, rather than the more typical three cut-
tings . Indeed, with climate change, Colorado farmers may 
be in a position to take a fourth cutting, thereby con-
suming more water than they have historically consumed . 
While many agricultural rights are defined as “seasonal,” 
the length of the season is not typically specified in the 
water rights decree .
A similar scenario could play out with a dry year option . 
Our farmer could sell an option on 71 acre-feet for use by a 
city during dry years, grow alfalfa in high water years, and 
shift to a low water-consumption crop in dry years when 
the city would receive the optioned water .
Importantly, none of this is possible under the current 
legal regime . The farmer who shifts from alfalfa to soy-
beans receives no credit for the water saved, and pays no 
penalty for shifting from soybeans to alfalfa, even if soy-
beans had been grown on the site for 100 years . While the 
prospect of selling water sometime in the future may not be 
the driving force behind decisions that farmers make about 
the types of crops to grow, it is surely an important fac-
tor in any cropping decision . And the incentives under the 
current system are all in favor of consuming more water . 
The proposed reforms would give farmers the incentive to 
consume less water and, in the process, potentially solve 
water scarcity issues for many years to come .
B.	 Demand	Conservation	and	Reclamation	Before	
Agricultural	to	Urban	Transfers	Are	Approved
Residents of rural areas are understandably unhappy about 
the prospect of watching more of the water resources that 
have historically supported their local economies trans-
ferred from agricultural to urban use . While a free market 
in water could accelerate this trend, states can and should 
provide rural communities with some assurance that 
water transfers will not be approved unless and until the 
buyer first demonstrates a clear need for additional water 
resources, and takes responsibility for restoring the land 
from which the water will be transferred to an appropriate 
condition adequate to promote and sustain its value and 
future uses .136
Municipal suppliers might demonstrate need by using 
all reasonable conservation measures in the communities 
they serve . “Reasonable conservation measures” could be 
defined either by statute or regulation as measures that 
bring per capita water use below a certain threshold, or 
perhaps through more prescriptive standards, such as 
J . Maas & Nithya Rajan, Agron . J . 100(2): 320-27, 327 (estimating ground 
cover of field crops using medium-resolution multispectral satellite imag-
ery . And observing that automation of satellite technology to monitor the 
vegetation canopy and bare soil line could be possible in the future, but 
currently has to be coupled with visual inspection) .
136 . See,e.g., Colo . Rev . Stat . Ann . §37-92-305(4 .5), which generally requires 
“reasonable provisions designed to accomplish the revegetation and noxious 
weed management of lands from which irrigation water is removed .”
requiring that cities employ aggressive block-rate pricing 
policies,137 or requiring that states recycle gray water .138
Restoration of the land might simply entail a commit-
ment, backed by a bond, requiring the city to establish a 
healthy, self-regenerating community of native grasses on 
the dry lands, or it might involve some long-term commit-
ment to engage in dry land farming139 or some other use 
that will ensure that the land does not become a burden to 
the host community .
While rural areas may continue to harbor some antipa-
thy toward cities for their ever-increasing demands for 
water, farmers are far more likely to accept water transfers 
if they can see that the cities have made an aggressive com-
mitment to conservation as a precondition to having agri-
cultural water transfers approved, and if they are assured 
that lands that are dried up as a result of an agricultural-to-




The CBT project is unique . Not only does it have the bene-
fit of substantial storage in the system, it holds water rights 
that are approved for a broad range of uses, operates an 
elaborate delivery system in the most populous areas of the 
northern Front Range of Colorado, and covers a substan-
tial portion of the northeastern part of that state .140 Under 
these circumstances, it is not surprising that the limited 
supply of CBT shares attracts many buyers and sellers . 
While it may be unlikely that other water organizations 
will have all of the advantages of the CBT project, many 
water entities will likely share some of the characteristics of 
the CBT project, and some water entities could conceiv-
ably establish marketable shares, similar to CBT shares, 
especially if states establish a system to facilitate the trans-
fer of consumptive use amounts, as suggested above .141
Most ditch companies hold legal title to the water rights 
used by their shareholders, but shares can be purchased by 
cities for urban use .142 However, most ditch companies’ 
137 . Douglas S . Kenney et al ., ResidentialDemandManagement:LessonsFrom
Aurora,Colorado, 44 J . Am . Water Res . Ass’n 192 (2008) .
138 . Yoram Cohen, GrayWater:APotentialSourceofWater, Southern California 
Environmental Report Card (Fall 2009), availableat http://www .environ-
ment .ucla .edu/reportcard/article .asp?parentid=4870 .
139 . Randy Creswell & Franklin W . Martin, Dryland Farming: Crops 
and Techniques for Arid Regions (1993, revised, 1998), available at 
http://www .echonet .org/repositories/download/30/Dryland%20Farming .
pdf .
140 . Seeid. Part IV .B .
141 . Seeid. Part IV E .
142 . See id. Part IV B; see also Jacobucci v . Dist . Court of Jefferson Cty ., 189 
Colo . 380, 388 (Colo . 1975):
Because the right seeking to be condemned, the right to make ben-
eficial application of the water, does not belong to the corporation, 
but to the shareholders, the mutual ditch corporation cannot be 
the only proper representative of the shareholders’ interests .   .   .   . 
Mutual ditch companies like Farmers were formed expressly for 
the purpose of furnishing water to shareholders, not for profit or 
hire .   .   .   . These companies are not organized under the general 
Colorado corporation statutes, but under special legislation for 
ditch and reservoir companies .
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water rights were granted strictly for agricultural use over a 
relatively small geographic area that may not include signif-
icant urban centers .143 Under these circumstances, chang-
ing the use and the place of use will require the parties to 
go through the cumbersome statutory transfer process .
States should recognize the natural advantages that 
these organizations share with the CBT project and the 
opportunities that would arise if they had more flexibility 
to transfer water rights outside the current transfer system . 
As previously argued, granting water organizations an eas-
ier path toward transfers would, at a minimum, require 
that their consumptive rights be clearly defined . But once 
that is done, states could use a streamlined transfer pro-
cess to allow mutual ditch companies and water districts 
to transfer consumptive rights outside their districts and 
for new uses .144 This would open up these entities to more 
robust marketing opportunities that could resolve many of 
our current urban water needs .
D.	 Promote	Temporary	Transfers
In recent years, much attention has been paid to the poten-
tial for temporary transfers to solve long-term water needs . 
While such transfers could be short-term or long-term, 
they are all distinguished by the fact that the party holding 
the water right does not relinquish her ownership interest .
For farmers concerned about the long-term health of 
their rural communities, this is a very attractive feature . 
As previously described, successful real-world examples of 
temporary transfers already exist, including the PVID’s 
rotational fallowing program that provides water to the 
MWD,145 and the Arizona Water Bank, which allows Las 
Vegas to bank groundwater in southern Arizona .146 But 
widespread use of temporary transfers is unlikely to occur 
unless states adopt legislative reforms designed to promote 
their use .147 The three primary temporary transfer mecha-
nisms—rotational fallowing, dry year options, and water 
banking—are described briefly below, along with policy 
reforms that could lead to their expanded use .
1.	 Rotational	Fallowing
As a tool for moving more water from agricultural to 
urban use, rotational fallowing has much to recommend 
 See Colo . Rev . Stat . Ann . §7-42-101 (2011) .
143 . NCWCD Management Plan, supra note 62, app . F .
144 . Compare,e.g., Ariz . Rev . Stat . §9-432 (2011); Cal . Water Code §§10505-
10505 .5, 11460; Colo . Rev . Stat . Ann . §37-45-118(1)(b)(II) (2011); 
Neb . Rev . Stat . §46-290 (2011); Nev . Rev . Stat . Ann . §533 .438(5) 
(2011); N .M . Stat . Ann . §72-5-29 (2011); Okla . Stat . tit . 82 §§105 .12, 
1086 .1 (2011); Texas Water Code §11 .085 (2011); Wyo . Stat . §41-3-104 
(2011) .
145 . As noted in the Super Ditch discussion, the PVID’s fallowing program was 
instrumental in inspiring proponents of the Super Ditch concept . See notes 
107-14 and accompanying text .
146 . See Winner, supra note 107 .
147 . See, e.g., Colo . Water Conservation Bd ., Alternative Agricultural 
Transfer Methods Grant Program Study 45-46 (May 2011), avail-
able at http://cwcb .state .co .us/water-management/water-supply-planning/
Pages/main .aspx (explaining that legislative changes may be necessary to 
remove the barriers to water transfers in Colorado) .
it . Farmers who participate in the program agree to fal-
low a portion of their land, and can thus continue to farm 
on the remaining land, focusing their efforts on the most 
productive lands, or rotating the fallowed land from year 
to year .148 The unused water made available by fallowing is 
then leased to a municipality .149 The MWD/PVID rota-
tional fallowing program is usually cited as a model for 
such programs, and for good reason . Despite the fact that 
the program moves a substantial volume of water from 
agricultural to urban use, it is remarkably simple, with 
one large buyer and one large seller who happen to have 
very senior water rights .150 The Super Ditch proposal may 
suggest the more typical model, but it remains to be seen 
whether that proposal will ever come to fruition . Several 
legal reforms, however, could help make rotational fallow-
ing programs like the Super Ditch more practical .
First and foremost, some progress must be made to 
streamline the normal water transfer process . The effort 
needed to design a program like the Super Ditch Com-
pany, with its many potential sellers and multiple buyers, 
is substantial and expensive, yet the parties have no assur-
ance that their efforts to transfer the relevant water rights 
will make it through the formal transfer process within 
a reasonable length of time . Moreover, it seems possible, 
perhaps even likely, that objections to the transfer will be 
filed and may succeed in limiting the amount of water 
available under the program, even if the transfer is ulti-
mately approved .
Even if a state is not ready to embrace a wholesale shift to 
defining water rights in terms of consumptive use, it might 
consider doing so in the case of temporary transfers . For 
example, the state could authorize the prospective seller to 
apply to the appropriate agency official for a consumptive 
use determination . The seller might even be asked to bear 
the cost of the determination . Once the determination is 
made following a process such as that suggested above,151 
the state could authorize the temporary transfer of the 
consumptive right . As suggested previously, such tempo-
rary transfers might further be conditioned to reduce the 
transfer by 10% to protect stream flows and to account 
for potential calculation errors, but they would follow a 
minimal process, as proposed more generally for consump-
tive use transfers .152 The law might also provide for minor 
adjustments to the consumptive use allocation to reflect 
actual experience once the program has been operating for 
several years .
148 . Id. at 5 .
149 . Id.
150 . The LAVWCD established the Super Ditch Company to act as a facilitator 
for the collective leasing of water rights between municipalities in southeast-
ern Colorado and individual shareholders of different ditch companies, see 
Peter D . Nichols, MemorandumtoWaterTablesRegardingtheSuperDitch:A
TemporaryWaterLeasingAlternativetoHistoricalPermanent“BuyandDry”
orIrrigatedLandintheLowerArkansasValley ¶ B (July 7, 2008) [hereinafter 
MemorandumtoWaterTables]; seealso Teresa A . Rice & Lawrence J . Mac-
Donnell, Agricultural toUrbanWaterTransfers inColorado:AnAssessment
of theIssuesandOptions, Colorado Water Resources Research Inst ., at 71 
(1993) .
151 . See note 114 and accompanying text .
152 . Id.
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Second, state law must allow these rotational fallowing 
programs to operate over a long period of time consistent 
with the planning needs of municipal water suppliers . 
Without some assurance that these programs will offer 
long-term water security (at least 30-40 years with provi-
sions for renewal), cities are unlikely to find rotational fal-
lowing an attractive option .153
2.	 Dry	Year	Options
Dry year options, or interruptible water supply agreements, 
operate much like an emergency water supply .154 A city may 
contract with a farmer to take that farmer’s water during 
dry years that meet certain criteria spelled out in legislation, 
or preferably in the option contract . This allows the city to 
avoid acquiring a much more costly permanent water sup-
ply where the water resources might be needed only once 
every 10 years . As with rotational fallowing agreements, 
this strategy will be viable for municipal suppliers only if 
the parties are willing and able to enter into long-term con-
tracts of at least 30-40 years with some assurance of an 
opportunity for renewal . If a city cannot secure a long-term 
commitment of access to water resources in dry years, it 
lacks an incentive to negotiate the option contract .
The Colorado interruptible water supply agreement stat-
ute155 offers a useful example of how not to establish a dry 
year option program . Under that law, a water owner may 
agree to forego her use of a water right during a dry year as 
provided under the terms of the agreement, and the State 
Engineer may approve and administer such agreements 
without the need for the formal adjudication that would 
otherwise be required for a water transfer .156 The State 
Engineer must, however, ensure that existing water rights 
would not be injured when the option is exercised, and 
furthermore must: (1) quantify the historical consumptive 
use of the water right, which then forms the basis for the 
option amount; (2)  describe the land where the water is 
decreed for use; and (3) approve a plan for proper manage-
ment of the land during the period when it is fallowed .157 
Although strict adherence to the no injury rule could 
prove problematic, for reasons already discussed, these are 
generally sensible requirements that could promote more 
streamlined decisions on these agreements .
Unfortunately, the statute goes on to limit the length of 
time for any agreement to 10 years, which can be renewed 
only once, and then only if the option has never been 
exercised .158 For a city seeking a secure water supply, this 
153 . Alternative Agricultural Transfers, supra note 147, at 5 (explaining 
that if a rotational fallowing agreement were used to provide water for a 
growing municipal demand, the agreement would need to be “ .   .   . long-
term, renewable, or even perpetual .  .  .  .”) .
154 . See generally Dry-YearWater Supply Reliability Contracts: ATool forWater
Managers, supra note 101 .
155 . Colo . Rev . Stat . Ann . §37-92-309 (2011) .
156 . Id.
157 . Id. at 309(3)(b) .
158 . Id. at 309(3)(c) . The statute also provides that the option may not be exer-
cised in more than three of the 10 years of the agreement . While this could 
be a limiting factor in the utility of these agreements, it is understandable 
limitation makes the Colorado interruptible water supply 
agreement statute unworkable .159
Fixing the Colorado statute would not be especially dif-
ficult, and it suggests the contours of the law that might 
be adopted in other states . At a minimum, states should 
make clear that de minimis injuries that might result 
from exercising a dry year option are not actionable in 
court . Actionable injuries should specifically be defined to 
exclude a change in the timing of return flows . Even more 
explicitly, the statute could simply provide that where the 
state approves the transfer of the historic consumptive use 
of a water right, perhaps less 10%, no injury to existing 
users shall be found . Without some provision like this, the 
parties to any such agreement face the prospect of transac-
tion costs that are essentially as high as those for regular 
water transfers .
States should also allow option agreements to last for 
at least 30 years, perhaps longer, with the possibility of 
renewal for additional 30-year terms . Municipal water 
suppliers cannot plan for future water needs unless they 
have some certainty about the availability of future sup-
plies . A well-defined option right can provide that assur-
ance . Guaranteeing the availability of an option right over 
a 10-year period, as authorized by the Colorado statute, is 
simply not adequate to incentivize municipal suppliers to 
negotiate an agreement .
3.	 Water	Banks
Water banks have been described broadly to encompass 
“an institutionalized process  .   .   . to facilitate the transfer 
of developed water to new uses .”160 This definition, how-
ever, could be viewed as encompassing many other types of 
water transfers, including rotational fallowing and dry year 
options . Moreover, the definition fails to convey the sense 
that water banks typically involve only temporary water 
transfers . A more nuanced definition that better reflects 
the term “water bank” might describe it as a program that 
establishes a repository or “bank” where parties can store 
water, together with a program for other parties to with-
draw water from the bank .
Water banks have been around for many years, dating 
back to the early 1930s in Idaho .161 The earliest legislation, 
also from Idaho, was enacted in 1979 .162 Since then, many 
other states have adopted some form of water banking .163 
Like other forms of temporary water transfers, water banks 
can help make water supplies available to meet critical 
that the state would want to avoid having parties use this provision to ac-
complish something that looks more like a permanent transfer of the water .
159 . Two minor applications were currently pending before the State Engineer, 
but at the time of this writing, no interruptible supply agreements have yet 
been approved under this provision . Telephone Interview with Joanna Wil-
liams, Water Resource Engineer, Colo . Div . Water Res . (July 6, 2012) .
160 . Lawrence MacDonnell, WaterBanks:UntanglingtheGordianKnotofWest-
ernWater, 41 Rocky Mtn . Min . L . Inst . 22-1 (1995) .
161 . MacDonnell et al ., UsingWaterBankstoPromoteMoreFlexibleWaterUse, 
Final Report, U .S . Geological Survey Award: 1434-92-2253 (1994) .
162 . Idaho Code §42-1761-1766 (2011) .
163 . AnalysisofWaterBanks, supra note 101 .
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needs, especially during dry years . They can also help pro-
mote conservation by providing water owners with a venue 
to market water supplies that they are able to conserve,164 
and by providing conservation groups and states a source 
for water needed to protect stream flows and fisheries .
Water banks can simply involve a paper transaction 
where, for example, water sellers answer a call from a 
buyer to forego the use of water to which the sellers are 
entitled .165 This might happen where a party interested in 
protecting stream flows purchases natural flow rights from 
a seller for a period of one or more years . More commonly, 
water banks involve physical storage, either in a reservoir 
or underground . Water banking in this situation might 
typically involve a water district with excess storage capac-
ity, willing to sell that capacity to parties with excess water 
rights . The district might then help facilitate a sale of the 
water to a third party, or perhaps issue credit to the original 
owner that allows that original owner to take the water at 
some later time, probably at some more convenient loca-
tion on the stream . A good example of this latter arrange-
ment is the Arizona Water Bank, which involves the state 
of Arizona and the Southern Nevada Water Authority 
(SNWA) .166 Under this program, the SNWA pays the state 
of Arizona to store Colorado River water in its groundwa-
ter aquifer . When the SNWA needs the water, it takes its 
entitlement from its regular diversion point on Lake Mead, 
well above the storage aquifers .167 Despite the apparent 
advantages of water banks, there have been a surprising 
dearth of successful banks,168 and, with limited exceptions, 
they do not currently seem to offer a reliable solution to 
municipal water shortage problems .
As with virtually every other recommendation set forth 
in this Article, promoting water banks begins with bet-
ter defining the water rights that are banked, so that they 
can be readily withdrawn by interested buyers, even if 
those buyers live outside the water district’s service area . 
While the SNWA arrangement with Arizona is somewhat 
unusual, it illustrates the high potential for water banks 
to address municipal water needs . For example, the cit-
ies along the Front Range of Colorado are all near major 
streams that flow out of the mountains . Some of that water 
is used for municipal purposes; most is dedicated to farm-
ers on the plains, who hold the most senior rights and who 
are often part of large water districts or mutual ditch com-
panies with significant capacity to store water . If these cit-
ies could purchase some storage capacity in the existing 
reservoirs and solicit willing sellers in the service area of 
the reservoir to dedicate some their water rights for use by 
the city, the city could then be issued credits that would 
allow it to divert that same amount of water at an outtake 
164 . Id. at 3 .
165 . Id. at 4 . The Washington Department of Ecology describes this as “institu-
tional banking .”
166 . Id.
167 . Storage and Interstate Release Agreement, supra note 124 .
168 . AnalysisofWaterBanks, supra note 101, at 16-18, tbl . 3 . This report indi-
cates that the only banks with high levels of activity are in California and 
Idaho . In the case of Idaho, the water values are so low ($3-10 .50/acre foot) 
as to suggest that they are not serving municipal needs .
near the city . Unfortunately, in Colorado, this transaction 
would almost certainly have to be adjudicated in a state 
water court, where it could be tied up for years . While 
the process might be somewhat less cumbersome in other 
states, the predominant no injury rule would still pose a 
significant obstacle to completing any such transaction . A 
streamlined transfer process for water bank transactions 
that would allow a simple transfer of the consumptive use 
amount less 10% could go a long way toward reinvigorat-
ing the water bank concept .
E.	 Take	Advantage	of	Existing	Distribution	Systems	
to	Move	Water
As described in the NCWCD case study,169 that District 
has a huge advantage in moving water efficiently because 
of the elaborate distribution system it has built, much of it 
funded by taxpayers . Indeed, the District could not con-
tinue to operate without the one mill tax that it assesses 
every year on all property within the District’s massive 
service area . The NCWCD and the many other publicly 
supported water districts throughout the West most likely 
own and operate the very best water distribution systems 
in the country, and they are able to do so in large part 
because they are taxpayer-supported . As quasi-public enti-
ties, it seems appropriate that they share the use of dis-
tribution systems with excess capacity when third parties 
might be in a position to use that system to transfer water 
and thereby help address water supply needs for urban and 
other uses .
Making excess distribution capacity available to third 
parties would help promote efficient water transfers by 
affording at least some water sellers a simple way to move 
water from the location of its current use to the point of 
new use . It could also generate revenues for the water dis-
trict, although a process for setting reasonable prices for 
wheeling water will have to be devised .
In 1986, California enacted a “water wheeling statute” 
that essentially adopts the policy suggested here .170 That law 
simply provides that “neither the state, nor any regional or 
local public agency may deny a bona fide transferor of 
water the use of a water conveyance facility which has 
unused capacity, for the period of time for which that 
capacity is available, if fair compensation is paid .”171 
The law goes on to define such key terms as “fair com-
pensation” and “unused capacity .” While evidence of 
the statute’s use is anecdotal, the courts have thus far 
construed the statute broadly to encompass not only 
large systems such as aqueducts and canals, but also 
local distribution systems .172
169 . The District charges a delivery fee for each unit delivered, which can be 
modified on an annual basis . Seesupra note 62 .
170 . Cal . Water Code §§1810-1814 (2011) .
171 . Id. §1810 .
172 . San Luis Coastal Unified School Dist . v . City of Morro Bay, 81 Cal . App . 
4th 1044, 97 Cal . Rptr . 2d 323 (2000) . Seealso Metropolitan Water Dist . 
of Southern California v . Imperial Irr . Dist ., 80 Cal . App . 4th 1403, 96 
Cal . Rptr . 2d 314 (2000), where the court of appeal held that the wheeling 
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VI. Conclusion
Water markets have long been viewed as a promising 
option for addressing water shortages, and as a tool for 
meeting burgeoning urban water demand in the western 
United States . But the traditional water laws of western 
states make it difficult and in some cases even impossible 
to operate efficient water markets . As a result, water trans-
fers and water marketing have thus far proved to be tools of 
limited utility for addressing the West’s future water needs . 
As drought, climate change, and ever-increasing popula-
tions put more pressure on the West’s limited water sup-
plies, some additional movement of water from agricultural 
to urban use seems inevitable . But water marketing offers 
the possibility of much more . With modest reforms to cur-
rent law, water marketing could be an efficient and effec-
tive solution for most of the West’s future water resource 
statutes did not preclude the MWD from including systemwide costs in cal-
culating its wheeling rate, and furthermore that the statute did not require 
the MWD to set its wheeling rates on a case-by-case basis as transactions 
were proposed .
challenges . And it could displace the need for destructive 
water development projects that continue to plague water 
resource management .
The reforms proposed here are politically challenging 
but relatively simple to describe and implement . Most 
fundamentally, water rights must be redefined in terms of 
their consumptive use amount, and states must streamline 
the process for transferring the consumptive use amount 
without undue obeisance to the no injury rule . Such a 
change would no doubt be controversial, but it could be 
implemented strategically, either with pilot programs or by 
adopting special legislation that would streamline trans-
fers for particular projects that are proposing innovative 
approaches to moving water . Water marketing has long 
been a favorite topic of academics . The time for moving it 
into the field is long overdue .
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